Preface: Confessions of a Neural Romantic | |
Acknowledgments | |
Melting the Inner Code | |
Computational Models, Syntax, and the Folk Solids | |
A Three-Point Turn | |
The Many Faces of Folk Psychology | |
First Answer | |
Second Answer | |
Third Answer | |
The Syntactic Image and Super-Fodorian Realism | |
Mind as Text versus Mind as Process 3 | |
Connectionism, Code, and Context | |
The USP Uncovered | |
Superposition--a Key Feature | |
Intrinsic Context Sensitivity | |
Why Context Sensitivity Does Not Have to ôBottom Outö | |
Strong Representational Change | |
On Text and Process | |
What Networks Know | |
The Tank and the Sun | |
Levels of Explanation | |
The Classical Cascade | |
Damming the Classical Cascade | |
Explanatory Inversion in Connectionist Cognitive Science | |
Beyond Cluster Analysis | |
The Need for Multiple Analyses | |
What Networks Don't Know | |
Hallucinating Knowledge | |
What NETtalk Doesn't Know | |
Net Knowledge and Nonconceptual Content | |
The Representational Redescription Hypothesis | |
Expertise | |
Condition-Action Recoupling | |
Cross-Domain Transfer | |
Conclusions: Concepts versus Information | |
Concept, Category, and Prototype | |
Concepts as Pattern-Recognition Devices | |
From Definitions to Prototypes | |
Do We Ever Create the Same Concept Twice? | |
Goal-Derived Categories | |
Linguistically Fixed Context | |
Points of View | |
Ad hoc Categories | |
Connectionist Models of Categorization | |
Plunkett and Sinha's Model of Concept Formation and Vocabulary Growth | |
Schyns' Modular Neural Network Model of Concept Acquisition | |
A Common Complaint | |
The Ubiquity of Theory | |
Concepts as Elements of Structured Thoughts | |
The Irony of Central Processing | |
What Symbols Don't Buy You | |
From Code to Process | |
The Presence of a Symbol | |
Of Codes and Constituents | |
The Syntactic Image (Again) | |
Functional Compositionality | |
Functional Explicitness | |
The Lost Dimension: Multiple Usability | |
All the World's a Processor | |
From Syntax to Process | |
The Role of Representational Trajectories | |
A Developmental Journey | |
Net Failures | |
How to Learn the Right Thing | |
The Bigger Picture: Scaffolding and Development | |
Systematicity and Cognitive Architecture | |
Escaping the Developmental Vacuum | |
The Cascade of Significant Virtual Machines | |
Transition Machines | |
Hybrid Models | |
The Past Remembered | |
Changing the Past | |
Gross Architecture and Stage-like Behavior | |
Generalization Revisited | |
Going Beyond Success | |
Some Interesting Features | |
Associative Learning in a Hostile World | |
Statistical Minds? | |
The Hostage Problem | |
Embedded Evolved Associative Engines | |
The Space of Innate Knowledge | |
Minimal Nativism9 | |
Nature's Problem | |
The Fate of the Folk | |
Two Dogmas of Super-Fodorian Realism | |
Causal Efficacy and Propositional Modularity | |
Superpositional Storage | |
Natural Kinds | |
Conceptual Modularity: The Bottleneck of Content | |
Concepts as Skills | |
Cognitive Science without Concepts | |
Explaining Behavior 8 | |
Dennett and the Missing Innards | |
The Defeasibility of the Folk Ascriptions | |
A Net to Cherish | |
Associative Engines--The Next Generation | |
A Multi-Dimensional Space | |
Macrocognition | |
Bracketing Full Systematicity | |
Macrocompositionality versus Microcompositionality | |
Minimal Nativism and Representational Change | |
Notes | |
Bibliography | |
Index | |
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