| List of Figures | p. x |
| Acknowledgments | p. xi |
| Introduction | p. 1 |
| What Does Conquest Mean in Cyberspace? | p. 4 |
| Precis | p. 10 |
| Hostile Conquest as Information Warfare | p. 15 |
| An Ideal-Type Definition of Information Warfare | p. 16 |
| Control at One Layer Is Not Control at Another | p. 24 |
| Applying the Ideal-Type Definition | p. 27 |
| There Is No Forced Entry in Cyberspace | p. 31 |
| Information Warfare Only Looks Strategic | p. 37 |
| IW Strategy and Terrorism | p. 43 |
| Conclusions | p. 49 |
| Information Warfare as Noise | p. 50 |
| Disinformation and Misinformation | p. 51 |
| Defenses against Noise | p. 55 |
| Redundancy | p. 55 |
| Filtration | p. 57 |
| What Tolerance for Noise? | p. 59 |
| Tolerance in Real Environments | p. 60 |
| Castles and Agoras | p. 62 |
| Hopping from Agoras to Castles? | p. 64 |
| Castling Foes | p. 66 |
| Concluding Observations | p. 71 |
| Can Information Warfare Be Strategic? | p. 73 |
| Getting In | p. 75 |
| Mucking Around | p. 79 |
| Spying | p. 79 |
| Denial of Service | p. 80 |
| Corruption | p. 81 |
| Distraction | p. 83 |
| Countermeasures | p. 84 |
| Redundancy | p. 84 |
| Learning | p. 85 |
| Damage Assessment | p. 87 |
| Prediction | p. 90 |
| Intelligence Is Necessary | p. 90 |
| Intelligence Alone Is Hardly Sufficient | p. 93 |
| Is Information Warfare Ready for War? | p. 95 |
| The Paradox of Control | p. 96 |
| Other Weaponization Criteria | p. 97 |
| Conclusions | p. 100 |
| Information Warfare against Command and Control | p. 102 |
| The Sources of Information Overload | p. 103 |
| Its Effect on Conventional Information Warfare Techniques | p. 105 |
| Coping Strategies | p. 107 |
| Who Makes Decisions in a Hierarchy? | p. 107 |
| Responses to Information Overload | p. 111 |
| Know the Enemy's Information Architecture | p. 116 |
| Elements of Information Culture | p. 117 |
| Elements of Nodal Architecture | p. 118 |
| Injecting Information into Adversary Decision Making | p. 118 |
| Ping, Echo, Flood, and Sag | p. 121 |
| Ping and Echo | p. 121 |
| Flood and Sag | p. 122 |
| Conclusions | p. 124 |
| Friendly Conquest in Cyberspace | p. 125 |
| A Redefinition of Conquest | p. 126 |
| The Mechanisms of Coalitions | p. 128 |
| The Particular Benefits of Coalitions | p. 130 |
| Information and Coalitions | p. 131 |
| The Cost of Coalitions in Cyberspace | p. 136 |
| Enterprise Architectures and Influence | p. 142 |
| Alliances with Individuals | p. 148 |
| The Special Case of Cell Phones | p. 151 |
| Alliances of Organizations | p. 155 |
| Ecologies of Technological Development | p. 155 |
| DoD's Global Information Grid (GIG) | p. 159 |
| Merging the Infrastructures of Allies | p. 164 |
| Conclusions | p. 166 |
| Friendly Conquest Using Global Systems | p. 169 |
| Geospatial Data | p. 170 |
| Coping with Commercial Satellites | p. 175 |
| Manipulation through Cyberspace | p. 178 |
| Getting Others to Play the Game | p. 180 |
| Some Conclusions about Geospatial Services | p. 182 |
| National Identity Systems | p. 182 |
| Two Rationales for a National Identity System | p. 183 |
| Potential Parameters for a Notional System | p. 184 |
| Constraints from and Influences over Foreign Systems | p. 187 |
| Compare, Contrast, and Conclude | p. 191 |
| Retail Conquest in Cyberspace | p. 193 |
| Information Trunks and Leaves | p. 194 |
| Where Does Cheap Information Come From? | p. 195 |
| Surveillance in Cyberspace | p. 198 |
| Making Information Global | p. 203 |
| Privacy | p. 204 |
| Amalgamating Private Information | p. 206 |
| Using the Information | p. 208 |
| General Coercion | p. 208 |
| Specific Coercion | p. 209 |
| Persuasion | p. 211 |
| Some Limits of Retail Warfare in Cyberspace | p. 214 |
| Using Retail Channels to Measure Wholesale Campaigns | p. 215 |
| Conclusions | p. 218 |
| From Intimacy, Vulnerability | p. 220 |
| Do the Walls Really Come Down? | p. 220 |
| Intimacy as a Target | p. 222 |
| The Fecklessness of Friends | p. 225 |
| Betrayal | p. 228 |
| Conclusions | p. 230 |
| Talking Conquest in Cyberspace | p. 231 |
| Four Layers of Communications | p. 232 |
| Human Conversation in Layers | p. 232 |
| Cyberspace in Layers | p. 236 |
| Complexity Facilitates Conquest | p. 240 |
| Complexity and Hostile Conquest | p. 241 |
| Complexity and Friendly Conquest | p. 242 |
| Semantics | p. 245 |
| Pragmatics | p. 249 |
| Lessons? | p. 255 |
| Managing Conquest in Cyberspace | p. 256 |
| Conducting Hostile Conquest in Cyberspace | p. 257 |
| Warding Off Hostile Conquest in Cyberspace | p. 262 |
| Byte Bullies | p. 262 |
| Headless Horsemen | p. 265 |
| Perfect Prevention | p. 268 |
| Total Transparency | p. 270 |
| Nasty Neighborhoods | p. 272 |
| Exploiting Unwarranted Influence | p. 276 |
| Against Unwarranted Influence | p. 281 |
| In Microsoft's Shadow | p. 282 |
| Microsoft and Computer Security | p. 285 |
| Conclusions | p. 289 |
| Why Cyberspace Is Likely to Gain Consequence | p. 291 |
| More Powerful Hardware and Thus More Complex Software | p. 292 |
| Cyberspace in More Places | p. 294 |
| Fuzzier Borders between Systems | p. 297 |
| Accepted Cryptography | p. 299 |
| Privatized Trust | p. 301 |
| The Possible Substitution of Artificial for Natural Intelligence | p. 303 |
| Conclusions | p. 306 |
| Index | p. 307 |
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