| Acknowledgements | p. xi |
| Emerging problems with the current spectrum management approach | p. 1 |
| Current spectrum management methods and their shortcomings | p. 3 |
| Why spectrum needs to be managed | p. 3 |
| The current management mechanisms | p. 4 |
| Shortcomings of the current system | p. 6 |
| Alternative management approaches | p. 8 |
| How this book addresses the new approaches | p. 9 |
| Reference | p. 9 |
| How changing technology is impacting spectrum management | p. 11 |
| Technology used to lend itself to discrete allocations | p. 11 |
| Multi-modal radios | p. 12 |
| Cognitive and software defined radios | p. 13 |
| Ultra-wideband | p. 20 |
| Summary | p. 23 |
| Alternative ways of dividing spectrum | p. 25 |
| Spectrum has been divided by frequency | p. 25 |
| UWB raises the possibility of division by power | p. 26 |
| Other divisions are also possible | p. 33 |
| Summary: in practice, changes to spectrum division would be minor | p. 34 |
| Markets | p. 35 |
| Market solutions | p. 37 |
| Introduction | p. 37 |
| Market methods | p. 38 |
| Market failures | p. 40 |
| Conclusion | p. 41 |
| Auctions | p. 43 |
| Introduction | p. 43 |
| Auctions versus administrative methods of assignment | p. 46 |
| Theory of auctions | p. 49 |
| Auction formats | p. 51 |
| Auction logistics | p. 76 |
| Conclusion | p. 81 |
| References | p. 82 |
| Spectrum trading: secondary markets | p. 85 |
| Introduction | p. 85 |
| Radio spectrum and market forces | p. 87 |
| Spectrum trading, markets and efficiency | p. 88 |
| Objections to spectrum trading | p. 92 |
| The implementation of spectrum trading in the UK | p. 94 |
| Trading in other countries | p. 97 |
| Conclusion | p. 103 |
| References | p. 104 |
| Technical issues with property rights | p. 105 |
| Introduction | p. 105 |
| Key elements of property rights | p. 106 |
| The problem of deployment density | p. 110 |
| Calculating noise floor levels | p. 112 |
| Making a property rights system work in practice | p. 112 |
| UWB and property rights | p. 115 |
| Managing interference | p. 116 |
| A detailed look at the definition of property rights | p. 117 |
| Summary | p. 121 |
| References | p. 122 |
| Economic issues with property rights | p. 123 |
| Creating property rights: economic aspects | p. 123 |
| Principles for the allocation of property rights | p. 124 |
| Underlays and overlays | p. 128 |
| Defining property rights for spectrum: commercial and economic issues | p. 131 |
| Conclusion | p. 136 |
| References | p. 137 |
| Competition issues relating to spectrum | p. 139 |
| Introduction | p. 139 |
| Competition issues in a command-and-control regime | p. 141 |
| Competition issues under a market regime for spectrum management | p. 143 |
| Spectrum caps | p. 147 |
| Conclusions | p. 148 |
| Band management | p. 151 |
| Introduction | p. 151 |
| Types of band manager | p. 152 |
| Fundamentals of band management | p. 154 |
| The business case for band management | p. 157 |
| Summary and conclusions | p. 163 |
| Reference | p. 164 |
| Regulation | p. 165 |
| Incentive based spectrum prices: theory | p. 167 |
| Introduction | p. 167 |
| Economic efficiency and radio spectrum | p. 169 |
| Productive efficiency and radio spectrum | p. 171 |
| Pricing radio spectrum to achieve economic efficiency | p. 174 |
| The Smith-NERA method of calculating spectrum prices | p. 175 |
| Setting spectrum prices to achieve efficiency using the Smith-NERA method | p. 178 |
| The interaction between spectrum pricing and spectrum trading | p. 181 |
| Conclusion | p. 184 |
| References | p. 185 |
| Incentive based spectrum pricing: practicalities | p. 187 |
| Introduction | p. 187 |
| Applying administrative incentive prices: some issues | p. 188 |
| Calculating AIP in practice: case study of fixed links in the UK | p. 193 |
| Incentive based spectrum charges in other countries | p. 199 |
| Conclusion | p. 200 |
| References | p. 202 |
| How the commons works | p. 203 |
| Introduction | p. 203 |
| The economics of the commons | p. 204 |
| The likelihood of congestion in radio spectrum | p. 209 |
| Quasi-commons: UWB and cognitive radio | p. 220 |
| Summary | p. 220 |
| References | p. 221 |
| Commons or non-commons? | p. 223 |
| Introduction | p. 223 |
| The use of market mechanisms to determine the amount of spectrum commons | p. 223 |
| The "total spectrum needed" approach | p. 224 |
| The "band-by-band" approach | p. 225 |
| Summary | p. 229 |
| Is public sector spectrum management different? | p. 231 |
| Introduction | p. 231 |
| Is public sector spectrum special? | p. 232 |
| Intermediate steps to encourage efficiency in public sector spectrum use | p. 234 |
| Public sector incentive problems | p. 237 |
| Conclusions | p. 238 |
| References | p. 238 |
| Are developing countries different? | p. 239 |
| Introduction | p. 239 |
| Consequences for spectrum management | p. 239 |
| Conclusion | p. 242 |
| References | p. 242 |
| Conclusions | p. 245 |
| Conclusions | p. 247 |
| A reminder of the problem | p. 247 |
| Key conclusions | p. 247 |
| In summary | p. 252 |
| Further reading | p. 253 |
| Abbreviations | p. 257 |
| Author biographies | p. 259 |
| Subject index | p. 263 |
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