"Forced to Be Good is fascinating and important. Emilie M. Hafner-Burton provides a compelling account of how the United States and Europe have used preferential trade arrangements to protect human rights in foreign countries. Her book poses a key challenge to the conventional wisdom on how norms of justice spread, and it will be of substantial interest to scholars and policymakers alike."-Edward D. Mansfield, Hum Rosen Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania
"In this book, Emilie Hafner-Burton shows convincingly that old-fashioned, interest-based political bargaining, not a moral impulse to improve the world, led to human rights being included in recent U.S. and European trade agreements. Despite mixed (at best) motivations, some of these agreements nevertheless made a positive contribution to improving human rights. Anyone interested in recent trade policymaking generally, or in using trade to influence human rights specifically, should read this book to find out how the process really works."-Kimberly Ann Elliott, Center for Global Development
"Why have human rights provisions increasingly been attached to preferential trade agreements in recent years? Forced to Be Good is the best single treatment of the issue I have read. Emilie Hafner-Burton argues, counterintuitively, that it's not because human rights NGOs have affected norms. She shows that a shift in institutional politics within the United States and the European Union made it impossible for political executives to negotiate trade deals as they had in the past. She demonstrates a positive correlation between legislative constraints on the executive and the extent to which human rights provisions were inserted into trade agreements."-Daniel Drezner, Tufts University
"A wonderfully provocative book! Emilie Hafner-Burton argues that the surge in trade agreements containing human rights clauses can be explained with reference not to powerful new norms of justice or vigorous lobbying by labor unions and NGOs but to their usefulness as tools with which policymakers in the West tackle parochial issues unrelated to the protection of human rights and compete for influence over trade policy. The message may not please; the empirical analysis, however, is systematic and compelling."-Walter Mattli, University of Oxford
