| Preface to the Dover Edition | p. ix |
| Preface | p. xi |
| Introductory Note | p. xv |
| List of Tables | p. xvii |
| List of Figures | p. xix |
| International Relations Games | p. 1 |
| Introduction | p. 1 |
| Two-Person Zero-Sum Games with Saddlepoints | p. 2 |
| Information in Games | p. 8 |
| Two-Person Zero-Sum Games without Saddlepoints | p. 13 |
| Pure and Mixed Strategies | p. 17 |
| Interpretation of Mixed Strategies | p. 20 |
| Two-Person Nonzero-Sum Games | p. 26 |
| Prisoner's Dilemma and the Theory of Metagames | p. 30 |
| Chicken and the Cuban Missile Crisis | p. 39 |
| Summary and Conclusion | p. 47 |
| Qualitative Voting Games | p. 51 |
| Introduction | p. 51 |
| Voting Procedures | p. 52 |
| Sincere Voting | p. 56 |
| Straightforward Strategies and Voting Procedures | p. 60 |
| Equilibrium Choices and Vulnerability | p. 63 |
| Desirable Strategies and Equilibria | p. 67 |
| The Relationship between Desirable and Admissible Strategies | p. 69 |
| Sophisticated Voting | p. 73 |
| Coalitions and Information | p. 78 |
| Voting on Voting Procedures | p. 82 |
| The Paradox of Voting | p. 85 |
| Empirical Examples | p. 88 |
| Summary and Conclusion | p. 96 |
| Quantitative Voting Games | p. 101 |
| Introduction | p. 101 |
| Requirements for a Voting System of Proportional Representation | p. 102 |
| Rules that Meet the Requirements | p. 104 |
| Interdependence of the Requirements | p. 106 |
| The Effects of Size | p. 108 |
| Information and the Choice of Strategies | p. 111 |
| Empirical Examples | p. 116 |
| Summary and Conclusion | p. 121 |
| Vote-Trading Games | p. 125 |
| Introduction | p. 125 |
| What the General Possibility Theorem Precludes | p. 126 |
| Judgments about Vote Trading | p. 129 |
| Definitions and Assumptions | p. 131 |
| Sincere and Insincere Voting | p. 133 |
| Initial Trades and the Paradox of Vote Trading | p. 137 |
| Subsequent Trades and the Instability of Vote Trading | p. 140 |
| The Consequences of Refusing to Trade | p. 142 |
| The Consequences of Forming Coalitions | p. 144 |
| Conditions Limiting Vote Trading | p. 148 |
| Empirical Examples of the Paradox of Vote Trading | p. 151 |
| Summary and Conclusion | p. 154 |
| Voting Power | p. 157 |
| Introduction | p. 157 |
| The Shapley-Shubik Index of Voting Power | p. 158 |
| The Banzhaf Index of Voting Power | p. 164 |
| Coalition Models of the Two Power Indices | p. 167 |
| Calculation of the Power Indices | p. 171 |
| Three Paradoxes of Voting Power | p. 176 |
| Empirical Applications of the Power Indices | p. 182 |
| Summary and Conclusion | p. 195 |
| Coalition Games | p. 199 |
| Introduction | p. 199 |
| Power and Coalitions | p. 200 |
| Restrictions on Coalition Alignments | p. 202 |
| The Stability of Alignments | p. 204 |
| Empirical Conclusions of the Luce-Rogow Model | p. 209 |
| The Concept of Winning | p. 213 |
| The Size Principle | p. 216 |
| The Information Effect | p. 220 |
| Empirical Evidence for the Size Principle | p. 222 |
| Criticisms of the Size Principle | p. 226 |
| An Alternative Goal: Maximizing One's Share of Spoils | p. 232 |
| Summary and Conclusion | p. 240 |
| Election Games | p. 243 |
| Introduction | p. 243 |
| The Need for Models to Assess the Consequences of Electoral Reform | p. 244 |
| Presidential Campaigns and Voting Behavior | p. 247 |
| The Goals of Candidates | p. 249 |
| The Popular-Vote Model | p. 251 |
| The Electoral-Vote Model | p. 255 |
| The 3/2's Allocation Rule | p. 257 |
| Why the Large States Are Favored | p. 260 |
| Testing the Models | p. 263 |
| Campaign Allocations and Biases through 1980 | p. 266 |
| Limitations and Extensions of the Models | p. 272 |
| Summary and Conclusion | p. 275 |
| Glossary | p. 279 |
| Annotated Bibliography | p. 291 |
| Index | p. 295 |
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