Acknowledgments | p. xv |
Basic Concepts in Group Problem Solving | p. 1 |
Group Task, Structure, Process, and Product | p. 1 |
Interpersonal Influence Processes | p. 3 |
Group Tasks | p. 3 |
Additive, Compensatory, Conjunctive, Disjunctive, and Complementary | p. 3 |
Divisible and Unitary | p. 5 |
Maximizing and Optimizing | p. 5 |
Intellective and Judgmental | p. 5 |
Summary | p. 6 |
Laboratory Experimental Research on Group Problem Solving | p. 7 |
Overview of Chapters | p. 7 |
Social Combination Models | p. 8 |
Marjorie Shaw's Classic Study | p. 8 |
Experimental Designs | p. 10 |
The Lorge and Solomon Model A | p. 10 |
The Lorge and Solomon Model A as an Application of the Binomial Theorem | p. 12 |
Smoke and Zajonc: Group Decision Schemes | p. 12 |
Thomas and Fink: Extension to More Than Two Response Alternatives | p. 15 |
Davis: Social Decision Scheme Theory | p. 16 |
Model Testing and Model Fitting | p. 19 |
Summary | p. 20 |
Memory and Group Problem Solving | p. 22 |
Recognition Memory | p. 23 |
Transactive Memory | p. 25 |
No Communication during Learning or Retrieval | p. 26 |
Communication during Retrieval | p. 27 |
Communication during Learning and Retrieval | p. 29 |
Nine Propositions | p. 31 |
Cognitive Interdependence and Convergent Expectations | p. 32 |
Shared and Unshared Information | p. 35 |
Optimal Assignment of Items to Members | p. 35 |
Shared and Unshared Knowledge | p. 37 |
Information Sampling Model | p. 37 |
Solving a Problem versus Making a Judgment | p. 38 |
Social Validation of Information | p. 38 |
Common Knowledge Effect | p. 40 |
Group Judgment | p. 40 |
Group Choice | p. 41 |
Jury Memory | p. 42 |
Summary | p. 43 |
Group Ability Composition on World Knowledge Problems | p. 45 |
English Vocabulary | p. 45 |
General Achievement | p. 52 |
Remote Verbal Associations | p. 53 |
Homogeneity and Heterogeneity of Group Member Ability | p. 54 |
Conclusions on Group Ability Composition | p. 55 |
Collective Induction | p. 57 |
An Inductive Rule-Learning Task | p. 58 |
Collective versus Individual Induction: Effects of Increasing Evidence | p. 58 |
Collective versus Individual Induction: Effects of Increasing Hypotheses | p. 65 |
Collective Induction with Increasing Hypotheses and Increasing Evidence | p. 67 |
Positive Hypothesis Tests and Negative Hypothesis Tests | p. 70 |
Simultaneous Collective and Individual Induction | p. 72 |
Social Combination Processes | p. 76 |
A Theory of Collective Induction | p. 80 |
Collective Induction in Competitive Auctions | p. 82 |
Letters-to-Numbers Problems | p. 87 |
Letters-to-Numbers Problems | p. 87 |
Letters-to-Numbers Strategies | p. 88 |
Two-Letter Substitution Strategy | p. 89 |
Multiletter Substitution Strategy | p. 89 |
Known Answer Strategy | p. 90 |
Combined Known Answer and Multiletter Substitution Strategy | p. 91 |
Groups Perform Better Than the Best Individuals | p. 91 |
Trials to Solution | p. 91 |
Letters per Equation | p. 92 |
Letters Identified per Equation | p. 92 |
Two-Letter Substitution Strategy | p. 93 |
Known Answer Strategy | p. 93 |
Summary of Results | p. 94 |
Discussion | p. 95 |
Groups Perform Better Than the Best Individuals: Informative Equations and Effective Strategies | p. 96 |
Five Instruction Conditions | p. 96 |
Trials to Solution | p. 98 |
Equations with Minimal Letters | p. 98 |
Groups Perform Better Than the Best Individuals: Effects of Group Size | p. 101 |
Previous Research on Group Size on Intellective Tasks | p. 101 |
Experimental Design | p. 103 |
Trials to Solution | p. 103 |
Why Do Groups Perform Better Than the Best Individuals on Letters-to-Numbers Problems? | p. 107 |
Group-to-individual Problem-Solving Transfer | p. 109 |
Specific Transfer | p. 109 |
Analogies | p. 109 |
Mathematical Problems | p. 111 |
General Transfer | p. 113 |
Mathematical Problems | p. 113 |
Brainteasers | p. 114 |
Logical Implication | p. 115 |
Four Issues in Group-to-individual Transfer | p. 116 |
Design | p. 119 |
Summary | p. 122 |
Social Choice Theory | p. 124 |
Basic Concepts of Social Choice Theory | p. 125 |
Motions (Alternatives) and Preference C For-Against Matrices | p. 125 |
Sequential Pairwise Voting and the Paradox of Voting | p. 126 |
Runoff Elections | p. 128 |
Rank Order Voting | p. 128 |
Approval Voting | p. 130 |
The Median Voter Theorem | p. 131 |
Condorcet Jury Theorem | p. 131 |
Experimental Evidence for Social Choice Theory | p. 132 |
The Median Voter Theorem | p. 132 |
Agenda Influence | p. 134 |
Condorcet Jury Theorem | p. 136 |
Successive Majorities in a Hierarchical System | p. 137 |
A Remarkable Concurrence | p. 139 |
Social Choice Theory and Group Problem Solving: The Constitutional Convention of 1787 | p. 140 |
Conclusions | p. 141 |
Generalizations | p. 141 |
Retrospective and Prospective | p. 142 |
References | p. 145 |
Index | p. 155 |
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