Preface | p. xi |
Introduction | p. 1 |
The geography of the issues | p. 9 |
Conceptual versus natural modality | p. 9 |
Implications for philosophy and psychology | p. 13 |
Of wolves and wolf-children | p. 16 |
Stalnaker's intelligent Martians | p. 20 |
Anti-realist arguments | p. 22 |
Realism in mind | p. 25 |
Innateness and theory of mind | p. 29 |
Thinking: images or sentences? | p. 31 |
Which language do we think with? | p. 40 |
The evidence from scientific psychology | p. 40 |
The evidence of introspection: images and imaged sentences | p. 49 |
The scope and strength of the introspective thesis | p. 52 |
Objections and elucidations | p. 55 |
Fallible introspection and Fodor | p. 60 |
Individuating propositional attitudes | p. 62 |
Animals and infants | p. 65 |
Language-learning and sub-personal thought | p. 67 |
Thought-based semantics | p. 73 |
The argument from foreign believers | p. 73 |
Grice's thought-based semantics | p. 76 |
Two objections | p. 78 |
Searle's version of thought-based semantics | p. 83 |
A marriage of Searle and Fodor? | p. 85 |
Causal co-variance theories | p. 88 |
Misrepresentation, and asymmetric causal dependence | p. 91 |
The all Ss problem | p. 96 |
Holism and language | p. 103 |
From mental realism to Mentalese | p. 103 |
The demand for scientific vindication | p. 105 |
The problem of holism | p. 107 |
Between holism and atomism | p. 111 |
Arguments for holism | p. 114 |
The need for a language-based semantics | p. 120 |
Language-based semantics 1: functional-role semantics | p. 123 |
Language-based semantics 2: canonical acceptance conditions | p. 127 |
First steps towards a theory of consciousness | p. 133 |
Retrospect: the need for a theory of consciousness | p. 133 |
Conscious versus non-conscious mental states | p. 135 |
Cartesian consciousness | p. 140 |
Why Cartesianism won't do | p. 143 |
What kind of theory do we want? | p. 147 |
Kirk: presence to central decision-making | p. 150 |
Higher-order discrimination and feel | p. 154 |
The case for higher-order thought theory | p. 157 |
Second (-order) steps towards a theory of consciousness | p. 164 |
Theory 1: actual and conscious | p. 164 |
Theory 2: actual and non-conscious | p. 166 |
Theory 3: potential and non-conscious | p. 170 |
Theory 4: potential and conscious | p. 174 |
Dennett 1978: availability to print-out | p. 176 |
Dennett 1991: multiple drafts and probes | p. 178 |
Time and indeterminacy | p. 183 |
Dennett on the place of language in thought | p. 187 |
A reflexive thinking theory of consciousness | p. 194 |
Reflexive thinking theory | p. 194 |
Contrasts and advantages | p. 198 |
Conscious versus non-conscious thinking | p. 201 |
Objections and elucidations | p. 204 |
The problem of unity | p. 208 |
The problem of phenomenal feel | p. 212 |
A Cartesian Theatre? | p. 217 |
Animals and infants revisited | p. 220 |
The involvement of language in conscious thinking | p. 225 |
An architecture for human thinking | p. 225 |
An evolutionary story | p. 231 |
The argument from introspection revisited | p. 234 |
Working memory and the central executive | p. 245 |
The thesis of natural necessity (weak) | p. 251 |
Objections and elucidations | p. 259 |
The thesis of natural necessity (strong) | p. 263 |
The scope and significance of NN | p. 269 |
Conclusion | p. 277 |
References | p. 280 |
Index | p. 287 |
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