Preface | p. xiii |
Voting Procedures | p. 1 |
Electing a Single Winner: Approval Voting in Practice | p. 3 |
Introduction | p. 3 |
Background | p. 6 |
Early History | p. 8 |
The Adoption Decisions in the Societies | p. 10 |
Does AV Make a Difference? | p. 14 |
Does AV Elect the Lowest Common Denominator? | p. 16 |
Is Voting Ideological? | p. 18 |
Summary and Conclusions | p. 21 |
Electing a Single Winner: Approval Voting in Theory | p. 23 |
Introduction | p. 23 |
Preferences and Strategies under AV | p. 25 |
Election Outcomes under AV and Other Voting Systems | p. 26 |
Stability of Election Outcomes | p. 37 |
Summary and Conclusions | p. 42 |
Appendix | p. 43 |
Electing a Single Winner: Combining Approval and Preference | p. 46 |
Introduction | p. 46 |
Definitions and Assumptions | p. 48 |
Preference Approval Voting (PAV) | p. 49 |
Fallback Voting (FV) | p. 52 |
Monotonicity of PAV and FV | p. 56 |
Nash Equilibria under PAV and FV | p. 58 |
The Effects of Polls in 3-Candidate Elections | p. 61 |
Summary and Conclusions | p. 66 |
Electing Multiple Winners: Constrained Approval Voting | p. 69 |
Introduction | p. 69 |
Background | p. 70 |
Controlled Roundings | p. 72 |
Further Narrowing: The Search May Be Futile | p. 75 |
Constrained Approval Voting (CAV) | p. 80 |
Unconstraining Votes: Two Alternatives to CAV | p. 82 |
Summary and Conclusions | p. 87 |
Electing Multiple Winners: The Minimax Procedure | p. 89 |
Introduction | p. 89 |
Minisum and Minimax Outcomes | p. 91 |
Minimax versus Minisum Outcomes: They May Be Antipodes | p. 97 |
Endogenous versus Restricted Outcomes | p. 101 |
Manipulability | p. 103 |
The Game Theory Society Election | p. 105 |
Summary and Conclusions | p. 108 |
Appendix | p. 109 |
Electing Multiple Winners: Minimizing Misrepresentation | p. 112 |
Introduction | p. 112 |
Obstacles to the Implementation of Proportional Representation (PR) | p. 113 |
Integer Programming | p. 115 |
Monroe's System | p. 116 |
Assigning More than One Candidate to a Voter | p. 119 |
Approval Voting | p. 121 |
Fractional Assignments | p. 123 |
Noninteger k | p. 125 |
The Chamberlin-Courant System | p. 126 |
Tullock's System | p. 127 |
Weighted Voting | p. 129 |
Nonmanipulability | p. 130 |
Representativeness | p. 131 |
Hierarchical PR | p. 133 |
Summary and Conclusions | p. 136 |
Appendixes | p. 138 |
Selecting Winners in Multiple Elections | p. 143 |
Introduction | p. 143 |
Referendum Voting: An Illustration of the Paradox of Multiple Elections | p. 145 |
The Coherence of Support for Winning Combinations | p. 149 |
Empirical Cases | p. 155 |
Relationship to the Condorcet Paradox | p. 160 |
Normative Questions and Democratic Political Theory | p. 165 |
Yes-No Voting | p. 167 |
Summary and Conclusions | p. 169 |
Fair-Division Procedures | p. 171 |
Selecting a Governing Coalition in a Parliament | p. 173 |
Introduction | p. 173 |
Notation and Definitions | p. 176 |
The Fallback (FB) and Build-Up (BU) Processes | p. 177 |
The Manipulability of FB and BU | p. 181 |
Properties of Stable Coalitions | p. 182 |
The Probability of Stable Coalitions | p. 186 |
The Formation of Majorities in the U.S. Supreme Court | p. 189 |
Summary and Conclusions | p. 193 |
Appendix | p. 195 |
Allocating Cabinet Ministries in a Parliament | p. 199 |
Introduction | p. 199 |
Apportionment Methods and Sequencing | p. 202 |
Sophisticated Choices | p. 206 |
The Twin Problems of Nonmonotonicity and Pareto-Nonoptimality | p. 209 |
Possible Solutions: Trading and Different Sequencing | p. 214 |
A 2-Party Mechanism | p. 215 |
Order of Choice and Equitability | p. 218 |
Summary and Conclusions | p. 220 |
Appendix | p. 221 |
Allocating Indivisible Goods: Help the Worst-Off or Avoid Envy? | p. 224 |
Introduction | p. 224 |
Maximin and Borda Maximin Allocations | p. 227 |
Characterization of Efficient Allocations | p. 229 |
Maximin and Borda Maximin Allocations May Be Envy-Ensuring | p. 234 |
Finding Envy-Unensuring Allocations | p. 244 |
Unequal Allocations and Statistics | p. 248 |
Summary and Conclusions | p. 250 |
Allocating a Single Homogeneous Divisible Good: Divide-the-Dollar | p. 252 |
Introduction | p. 252 |
DD1: A Reasonable Payoff Scheme | p. 254 |
DD2: Adding a Second Stage | p. 257 |
DD3: Combining DD1 and DD2 | p. 262 |
The Solutions with Entitlements | p. 263 |
Summary and Conclusions | p. 266 |
Appendix | p. 267 |
Allocating Multiple Homogeneous Divisible Goods: Adjusted Winner | p. 271 |
Introduction | p. 271 |
Proportionality, Envy-Freeness, and Efficiency | p. 272 |
Adjusted Winner (AW) | p. 273 |
Issues at Camp David | p. 275 |
The AW Solution | p. 279 |
Practical Considerations | p. 282 |
Summary and Conclusions | p. 287 |
Allocating a Single Heterogeneous Good: Cutting a Cake | p. 289 |
Introduction | p. 289 |
Cut-and-Choose: An Example | p. 290 |
The Surplus Procedure (SP) | p. 292 |
Three or More Players: Equitability and Envy-Freeness May Be Incompatible | p. 296 |
The Squeezing Procedure | p. 297 |
The Equitability Procedure (EP) | p. 299 |
Summary and Conclusions | p. 303 |
Allocating Divisible and Indivisible Goods | p. 305 |
Introduction | p. 305 |
Definitions and Assumptions | p. 306 |
Difficulties with Equal and Proportional Reductions in the High Bids | p. 308 |
The Gap Procedure | p. 312 |
Pareto-Optimality | p. 314 |
Envy-Freeness: An Impossible Dream | p. 316 |
Sincerity and Independence | p. 322 |
Extending the Gap Procedure | p. 323 |
Other Applications | p. 324 |
Summary and Conclusions | p. 327 |
Summary and Conclusions | p. 329 |
Glossary | p. 337 |
References | p. 343 |
Index | p. 363 |
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