| Preface | p. xiii |
| Voting Procedures | p. 1 |
| Electing a Single Winner: Approval Voting in Practice | p. 3 |
| Introduction | p. 3 |
| Background | p. 6 |
| Early History | p. 8 |
| The Adoption Decisions in the Societies | p. 10 |
| Does AV Make a Difference? | p. 14 |
| Does AV Elect the Lowest Common Denominator? | p. 16 |
| Is Voting Ideological? | p. 18 |
| Summary and Conclusions | p. 21 |
| Electing a Single Winner: Approval Voting in Theory | p. 23 |
| Introduction | p. 23 |
| Preferences and Strategies under AV | p. 25 |
| Election Outcomes under AV and Other Voting Systems | p. 26 |
| Stability of Election Outcomes | p. 37 |
| Summary and Conclusions | p. 42 |
| Appendix | p. 43 |
| Electing a Single Winner: Combining Approval and Preference | p. 46 |
| Introduction | p. 46 |
| Definitions and Assumptions | p. 48 |
| Preference Approval Voting (PAV) | p. 49 |
| Fallback Voting (FV) | p. 52 |
| Monotonicity of PAV and FV | p. 56 |
| Nash Equilibria under PAV and FV | p. 58 |
| The Effects of Polls in 3-Candidate Elections | p. 61 |
| Summary and Conclusions | p. 66 |
| Electing Multiple Winners: Constrained Approval Voting | p. 69 |
| Introduction | p. 69 |
| Background | p. 70 |
| Controlled Roundings | p. 72 |
| Further Narrowing: The Search May Be Futile | p. 75 |
| Constrained Approval Voting (CAV) | p. 80 |
| Unconstraining Votes: Two Alternatives to CAV | p. 82 |
| Summary and Conclusions | p. 87 |
| Electing Multiple Winners: The Minimax Procedure | p. 89 |
| Introduction | p. 89 |
| Minisum and Minimax Outcomes | p. 91 |
| Minimax versus Minisum Outcomes: They May Be Antipodes | p. 97 |
| Endogenous versus Restricted Outcomes | p. 101 |
| Manipulability | p. 103 |
| The Game Theory Society Election | p. 105 |
| Summary and Conclusions | p. 108 |
| Appendix | p. 109 |
| Electing Multiple Winners: Minimizing Misrepresentation | p. 112 |
| Introduction | p. 112 |
| Obstacles to the Implementation of Proportional Representation (PR) | p. 113 |
| Integer Programming | p. 115 |
| Monroe's System | p. 116 |
| Assigning More than One Candidate to a Voter | p. 119 |
| Approval Voting | p. 121 |
| Fractional Assignments | p. 123 |
| Noninteger k | p. 125 |
| The Chamberlin-Courant System | p. 126 |
| Tullock's System | p. 127 |
| Weighted Voting | p. 129 |
| Nonmanipulability | p. 130 |
| Representativeness | p. 131 |
| Hierarchical PR | p. 133 |
| Summary and Conclusions | p. 136 |
| Appendixes | p. 138 |
| Selecting Winners in Multiple Elections | p. 143 |
| Introduction | p. 143 |
| Referendum Voting: An Illustration of the Paradox of Multiple Elections | p. 145 |
| The Coherence of Support for Winning Combinations | p. 149 |
| Empirical Cases | p. 155 |
| Relationship to the Condorcet Paradox | p. 160 |
| Normative Questions and Democratic Political Theory | p. 165 |
| Yes-No Voting | p. 167 |
| Summary and Conclusions | p. 169 |
| Fair-Division Procedures | p. 171 |
| Selecting a Governing Coalition in a Parliament | p. 173 |
| Introduction | p. 173 |
| Notation and Definitions | p. 176 |
| The Fallback (FB) and Build-Up (BU) Processes | p. 177 |
| The Manipulability of FB and BU | p. 181 |
| Properties of Stable Coalitions | p. 182 |
| The Probability of Stable Coalitions | p. 186 |
| The Formation of Majorities in the U.S. Supreme Court | p. 189 |
| Summary and Conclusions | p. 193 |
| Appendix | p. 195 |
| Allocating Cabinet Ministries in a Parliament | p. 199 |
| Introduction | p. 199 |
| Apportionment Methods and Sequencing | p. 202 |
| Sophisticated Choices | p. 206 |
| The Twin Problems of Nonmonotonicity and Pareto-Nonoptimality | p. 209 |
| Possible Solutions: Trading and Different Sequencing | p. 214 |
| A 2-Party Mechanism | p. 215 |
| Order of Choice and Equitability | p. 218 |
| Summary and Conclusions | p. 220 |
| Appendix | p. 221 |
| Allocating Indivisible Goods: Help the Worst-Off or Avoid Envy? | p. 224 |
| Introduction | p. 224 |
| Maximin and Borda Maximin Allocations | p. 227 |
| Characterization of Efficient Allocations | p. 229 |
| Maximin and Borda Maximin Allocations May Be Envy-Ensuring | p. 234 |
| Finding Envy-Unensuring Allocations | p. 244 |
| Unequal Allocations and Statistics | p. 248 |
| Summary and Conclusions | p. 250 |
| Allocating a Single Homogeneous Divisible Good: Divide-the-Dollar | p. 252 |
| Introduction | p. 252 |
| DD1: A Reasonable Payoff Scheme | p. 254 |
| DD2: Adding a Second Stage | p. 257 |
| DD3: Combining DD1 and DD2 | p. 262 |
| The Solutions with Entitlements | p. 263 |
| Summary and Conclusions | p. 266 |
| Appendix | p. 267 |
| Allocating Multiple Homogeneous Divisible Goods: Adjusted Winner | p. 271 |
| Introduction | p. 271 |
| Proportionality, Envy-Freeness, and Efficiency | p. 272 |
| Adjusted Winner (AW) | p. 273 |
| Issues at Camp David | p. 275 |
| The AW Solution | p. 279 |
| Practical Considerations | p. 282 |
| Summary and Conclusions | p. 287 |
| Allocating a Single Heterogeneous Good: Cutting a Cake | p. 289 |
| Introduction | p. 289 |
| Cut-and-Choose: An Example | p. 290 |
| The Surplus Procedure (SP) | p. 292 |
| Three or More Players: Equitability and Envy-Freeness May Be Incompatible | p. 296 |
| The Squeezing Procedure | p. 297 |
| The Equitability Procedure (EP) | p. 299 |
| Summary and Conclusions | p. 303 |
| Allocating Divisible and Indivisible Goods | p. 305 |
| Introduction | p. 305 |
| Definitions and Assumptions | p. 306 |
| Difficulties with Equal and Proportional Reductions in the High Bids | p. 308 |
| The Gap Procedure | p. 312 |
| Pareto-Optimality | p. 314 |
| Envy-Freeness: An Impossible Dream | p. 316 |
| Sincerity and Independence | p. 322 |
| Extending the Gap Procedure | p. 323 |
| Other Applications | p. 324 |
| Summary and Conclusions | p. 327 |
| Summary and Conclusions | p. 329 |
| Glossary | p. 337 |
| References | p. 343 |
| Index | p. 363 |
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