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Hardcover
192 Pages
192 Pages
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21.6 x 15.1 x 1.7
21.6 x 15.1 x 1.7
Hardcover
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Why is debate over the free will problem so intractable? This question forms the starting point for Richard Double's ground-breaking account of the way metaphilosophical views - our differing conceptions of the philosophical enterprise - condition competing theories of free will. Double holds that any argument for or against a specific free will position - such as compatibilism, incompatibilism, or the author's own subjectivism - will be persuasive only if one adopts supporting meta-level views of what philosophy is. He argues further that since metaphilosophical considerations are not provable (and are not even true or false, if subjectivism is true), there can be no hope of showing one free will theory to be more reasonable than the rest. Rather, the most philosophers can do is make a desire-based case for preferring their package of metaphilosophy and substantive free will theories. These means that argument in the free will problem must be radically reinterpreted.
Double begins by elaborating the connection between metaphilosophy and free will. He identifies four distinct meta-level viewpoints that drive different answers to the free will problem: Philosophy as Conversation; Philosophy as Praxis; Philosophy as Underpinnings; and Philosophy as World View Construction. From there, he discusses intermediate-level principles that work in combination with the meta-philosophies, then provides ten applications from recent free will debates that demonstrate how differences in meta-philosophy make the free will problem unsolvable. In the second half of the book Double makes the strongest case he can - consistent with his own metaphilosophical view - for accepting free will subjectivism.
Double begins by elaborating the connection between metaphilosophy and free will. He identifies four distinct meta-level viewpoints that drive different answers to the free will problem: Philosophy as Conversation; Philosophy as Praxis; Philosophy as Underpinnings; and Philosophy as World View Construction. From there, he discusses intermediate-level principles that work in combination with the meta-philosophies, then provides ten applications from recent free will debates that demonstrate how differences in meta-philosophy make the free will problem unsolvable. In the second half of the book Double makes the strongest case he can - consistent with his own metaphilosophical view - for accepting free will subjectivism.
Industry Reviews
[A] concise and startling treatment of free will."--Choice
"This work has all the virtues of Double's earlier book, The Non-Reality of Free Will. It is iconoclastic in the views defended and, as a consequence, highly provocative--yet at the same time very well-argued. It should be read widely and will provoke sharp reactions from philosophers and others in different fields."--Robert Kane, University of Texas at Austin
"The most innovative work on free will in the last decade. Double clearly and persuasively argues that, at root, the differing views on free will have their origins in distinct conceptions about the nature of philosophy itself. This work will energize discussion in this area. In elucidating assumptions that Compatibilists, Libertarians, and Hard Determinists hold, we discover that the relevant domain of argument revolves around questions of greater generality
than previously acknowledged. With jargon-free, cogent argumentation, this work may well prove to be a watershed in the free will debate."--Mark Bernstein,University of Texas at San Antonio
"For those of us who have been simultaneously fascinated and frustrated by the twists and turns and dead ends in the long debate over free will, this is the road atlas we have longed for. Richard Double's Metaphilosophy and Free Will is not only a sure guide through the maze of arguments and positions; it also makes clear the connections and conflicts, and most importantly it makes plain the key hidden assumptions that have subtly shaped the debate.
Metaphilosophy and Free Will argues cogently for a preferred route throughout the free will tangle, but even those who do not accept the overall conclusions will find this an enlightening tour.[cont. in next
field]
[cont. from above] This is a book packed with insights, insights offered by a philosopher with thorough detailed knowledge of the contemporary free will debate, who combines that knowledge of detail with a profound grasp of the larger philosophical context in which that debate occurs. When struggling with the free will question, I have often had the sense of looking through a glass darkly; Richard Double's Metaphilosophy and Free Will brilliantly
washes that philosophical window."--Bruce N. Waller, Youngstown State University
[A] concise and startling treatment of free will."--Choice
"This work has all the virtues of Double's earlier book, The Non-Reality of Free Will. It is iconoclastic in the views defended and, as a consequence, highly provocative--yet at the same time very well-argued. It should be read widely and will provoke sharp reactions from philosophers and others in different fields."--Robert Kane, University of Texas at Austin
"The most innovative work on free will in the last decade. Double clearly and persuasively argues that, at root, the differing views on free will have their origins in distinct conceptions about the nature of philosophy itself. This work will energize discussion in this area. In elucidating assumptions that Compatibilists, Libertarians, and Hard Determinists hold, we discover that the relevant domain of argument revolves around questions of greater generality
than previously acknowledged. With jargon-free, cogent argumentation, this work may well prove to be a watershed in the free will debate."--Mark Bernstein,University of Texas at San Antonio
"For those of us who have been simultaneously fascinated and frustrated by the twists and turns and dead ends in the long debate over free will, this is the road atlas we have longed for. Richard Double's Metaphilosophy and Free Will is not only a sure guide through the maze of arguments and positions; it also makes clear the connections and conflicts, and most importantly it makes plain the key hidden assumptions that have subtly shaped the debate.
Metaphilosophy and Free Will argues cogently for a preferred route throughout the free will tangle, but even those who do not accept the overall conclusions will find this an enlightening tour.[cont. in next
field]
[cont. from above] This is a book packed with insights, insights offered by a philosopher with thorough detailed knowledge of the contemporary free will debate, who combines that knowledge of detail with a profound grasp of the larger philosophical context in which that debate occurs. When struggling with the free will question, I have often had the sense of looking through a glass darkly; Richard Double's Metaphilosophy and Free Will brilliantly
washes that philosophical window."--Bruce N. Waller, Youngstown State University
"Richard Double, a prominent contributor to the current free will debate, has written another book of great originality that advances the field. Few readers will agree with the central thesis, but all will be challenged."--Stephen J. Morse, University of Pennsylvania
"Double provocatively explores the connection between metaphilosophy and traditional ways of thinking about free will. His style is clear, direct, and engaging, and his writing is informed by an admirably broad knowledge of the literature."--Alfred Mele, Davidson College
"In addition to providing a useful overview of the recent debate, [Double's] discussion enables one to see how positions one might initially be inclined to dismiss as unreasonable make good sense if seen from the appropriate metaphysical stance."--Dan J. Rossini and Staff
Introduction | p. 3 |
Free Will Subjectivism and Metaphilosophy | p. 3 |
An Example of the Importance of Metaphilosophy | p. 8 |
A Provisional Definition of Free Choice | p. 10 |
Overview of the Book | p. 12 |
The Free Will Problem as a Problem in Metaphilosophy | |
Metaphilosophies | p. 17 |
What Is Philosophy For? | p. 17 |
Desires-for-Philosophy and Conceptions of Philosophy | p. 19 |
Four Metaphilosophies | p. 22 |
The Importance of Having a Metaphilosophy | p. 32 |
The Unprovability of Metaphilosophy: Two Reasons | p. 33 |
Three Objections to the Relativity of Metaphilosophies | p. 37 |
Conclusion | p. 39 |
Intermediate-Level Philosophical Principles | p. 40 |
Five Pairs of Intermediate Principles | p. 40 |
The Unprovability of Intermediate-Level Principles | p. 47 |
The Interplay of Metaphilosophies, Intermediate Principles, and Lower-Level Theories | p. 49 |
Why Adopt Philosophy as Continuous with Science? | p. 53 |
Conclusion | p. 55 |
How the Free Will Debate Depends on Metaphilosophy (I) | p. 56 |
Reasons for Believing in Free Will | p. 56 |
The Burden-of-Proof Issue | p. 60 |
How Far May Philosophers 'Go' to Accommodate Free Will? | p. 62 |
Strawson's Subjectivist Account of Blame | p. 63 |
The Debate over Dual Rationality | p. 69 |
How the Free Will Debate Depends on Metaphilosophy (II) | p. 77 |
The Analogy between the Metaphysics of Ethics and the Metaphysics of Free Will | p. 78 |
Van Inwagen's Consequence Argument | p. 82 |
Frankfurt's Principle of Alternative Possibilities | p. 86 |
Is Equal Proof Needed in All Areas of Philosophy? | p. 90 |
Standard and Non-Standard Views of Moral Responsibility | p. 93 |
Conclusion | p. 96 |
Free Will from the Perspective of Philosophy as Continuous With Science | |
How to Frame the Free Will Problem | p. 99 |
A Radical Approach to Free Will | p. 100 |
Four Free Will Theories | p. 101 |
Another Theory | p. 103 |
Conclusion | p. 108 |
The Fragmentation of Free Will | p. 109 |
The Unity Objection | p. 110 |
The Fragmentation-Is-No-Problem Objection | p. 111 |
Two Preliminary Reasons to Reject Both Types of the Fragmentation-Is-No-Problem Objection | p. 112 |
Reasons to Reject the Bald Example | p. 114 |
Reasons to Reject Cockburn's Move | p. 119 |
Mele's Objection | p. 122 |
Conclusion | p. 124 |
Free Will Is a Moral Concept | p. 126 |
What Does It Mean to Call Free Choice a Moral Term? | p. 127 |
A Preliminary Reason for Thinking That Free Choice Is Moral | p. 128 |
The Open-Question Argument: Goodness and Freeness | p. 130 |
The Analogy with Moral Facts: Freeness Facts Have No Explanatory Power | p. 132 |
The Goodness of Ultimacy | p. 134 |
The Dispute over Magnanimity | p. 138 |
Conclusion | p. 142 |
Hume's Principle: The Subjectivity of Moral Responsibility and Free Will | p. 143 |
Defining the Key Terms | p. 144 |
Why Hume's Principle Implies That Ascriptions of Moral Responsibility Cannot Be True | p. 147 |
Why Hume's Principle Implies That Free Choice Is a Moral Concept | p. 151 |
Conclusion | p. 154 |
Conclusion | p. 156 |
Where We Are | p. 156 |
Philosophical Consequences | p. 158 |
Consequences for Persons | p. 161 |
References | p. 167 |
Index | p. 173 |
Table of Contents provided by Syndetics. All Rights Reserved. |
ISBN: 9780195107623
ISBN-10: 0195107624
Published: 1st September 1996
Format: Hardcover
Language: English
Number of Pages: 192
Audience: Professional and Scholarly
Publisher: Oxford University Press USA
Country of Publication: GB
Dimensions (cm): 21.6 x 15.1 x 1.7
Weight (kg): 0.37
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