Necessary Factual Truth

By: Gregory M. Browne

Write A Review

Hardcover | 1 December 1999

Sorry, we are not able to source the book you are looking for right now.

We did a search for other books with a similar title, however there were no matches. You can try selecting from a similar category, click on the author's name, or use the search box above to find your book.

In this book Gregory Browne rejects the views of David Hume and the Logical Positivists, and argues that there are necessary factual truths, which include a wide range of truths from many fields of knowledge. Browne argues for the necessity of Newton's Laws and truths about natural kinds, and for the factuality of definitional truths and truths of logic and mathematics. Browne synthesizes the work of Kripke, Putnam, Quine and others, but goes beyond the usual discussions of the meanings and definitions of terms to discuss the references of various kinds of terms, and specifically to develop a theory of kinds, distinguishing 'Deep Kinds' (roughly, natural kinds) and 'Shallow Kinds' (e.g., triangles, bachelors). His theory of Deep Kinds does not accept all of the assumptions commonly associated wtih a theory of natural kinds.

Shipping

	Standard Shipping	Express Shipping
Metro postcodes:	$9.99	$14.95
Regional postcodes:	$9.99	$14.95
Rural postcodes:	$9.99	$14.95

Orders over $79.00 qualify for free shipping.

How to return your order

At Booktopia, we offer hassle-free returns in accordance with our returns policy. If you wish to return an item, please get in touch with Booktopia Customer Care.

Additional postage charges may be applicable.

Defective items

If there is a problem with any of the items received for your order then the Booktopia Customer Care team is ready to assist you.

For more info please visit our Help Centre.

You Can Find This Book In

Non-Fiction Philosophy History of Western Philosophy Western Philosophy Analytical Philosophy & Logical Positivism Epistemology & The Theory of Knowledge

Preface	p. xix
Acknowledgements	p. xxi
The Opposing Views
Introduction	p. 1
The Principal Grounds for the Denial of Necessary Factual Truths	p. 21
Dichotomism	p. 22
Underlying Premises	p. 23
Evolution of These Views	p. 30
Background
Preliminaries: Terms, References, Concepts, Meanings, and Declaratives	p. 49
Terms	p. 50
Referring, Referents and References	p. 51
Concepts	p. 51
Meanings	p. 52
Introduction to Extensions and Intensions	p. 52
Extensions Further Considered	p. 52
Intensions Further Considered	p. 52
Descriptions	p. 54
What Meanings Are	p. 54
Introduction to Definitions	p. 55
Declaratives	p. 57
General Remarks	p. 57
Conditionals	p. 58
Categories and Classes	p. 61
Categories	p. 61
General Remarks	p. 61
Some Special Considerations Regarding Attributes	p. 63
An objection to attributes	p. 63
Complex attributes and attributes of attributes	p. 63
Individuals and Classes	p. 64
General Remarks	p. 64
Persistance of an Individual Through Change	p. 64
Individual Attributes	p. 65
General Attributes, and Resemblance	p. 66
Introduction	p. 66
Resemblance	p. 66
General remarks	p. 66
All resemblances as reducible to resemblances of attributes	p. 67
Resemblance and distinguishing types of attribute	p. 70
Armstrong's Objection to Tropes and My Reply	p. 71
How Much of the Doctrine is Necessary for My Conclusions	p. 72
Individual or General Attributes of Individuals	p. 72
Individuals' Intensions	p. 72
Peculiar Attributes of Individuals	p. 73
"Common" Attributes of Classes	p. 73
Introduction	p. 73
Classes' Intensions	p. 74
Common and Peculiar Attributes of Classes	p. 74
Universal and Particular Predication	p. 74
Common Attributes of Individuals-as-Classes	p. 75
Introduction	p. 75
Intensions of Individuals-as-Classes	p. 75
Intensional Definitions and Descriptions	p. 75
Introduction	p. 75
Types of Intensional Definitions of Individuals and Classes	p. 76
Completeness of Descriptions of Individuals and Classes	p. 78
Definitions by Peculiar Attributes	p. 79
Definitions by peculiar attributes and common and peculiar attributes	p. 79
Definitions by contextually peculiar attributes	p. 80
Adequacy	p. 80
Examples of definitions of individuals, and of individuals-as-classes, by at least contextually peculiar attributes	p. 82
Examples of definitions of classes by at least contextually common and peculiar attributes	p. 82
Definitions of classes by fundamentally common and jointly peculiar attributes	p. 84
Necessity	p. 89
Possible Worlds Talk	p. 90
Possible-Worlds Talk as Figurative	p. 90
Worldbound and Transworld Individuals and Classes	p. 91
Transworld-Talk as Figurative: Necessity and Conditionals	p. 92
Modalities	p. 93
The Modalities at the Actual World	p. 94
General remarks	p. 94
Changing individuals at the actual world	p. 94
Introduction	p. 94
Necessitarian objections	p. 96
Persisting attributes of world-bound individuals as necessary	p. 100
Modalities Across Worlds	p. 101
Transworld individuals as classes extending to other possible worlds	p. 102
The alethic modalities applied transworld to individuals	p. 103
Future modalities	p. 103
The non-actual past and present	p. 105
Necessary Attributes of Classes and of Individuals-As-Classes	p. 106
Essences	p. 106
Introduction	p. 106
An Objection to Individual Essences	p. 108
Definitions by Necessary Attributes	p. 109
Introduction	p. 109
Definitions by Necessary and Peculiar Attributes and Definitions by Necessary and Sufficient Attributes (Essential Definitions)	p. 110
Necessary Truth	p. 114
Introduction	p. 114
Three Kinds of Necessary Truth	p. 114
The Necessity of Necessary Conditionals	p. 116
Classes of Transworld Individuals with More than One Member	p. 118
Narrow Classes and Wide Classes (Kinds)	p. 123
Narrow Classes and Wide Classes (Kinds): a Characterization of the Difference	p. 123
Introduction	p. 123
A Further Property of Kinds	p. 123
Determination of the Boundaries of Kinds	p. 126
General remarks	p. 126
Connections to other distinctions	p. 127
Specifying and ascertaining the boundaries	p. 127
An Objection and an Amended Characterization	p. 128
Non-Actual Members of Kinds and Conditionality	p. 129
Non-Actual Members of Kinds as Existing	p. 129
Conditionality and Kinds	p. 129
Talking of Non-Actual Possibles as Actual Members of Kinds	p. 130
The Existence of Kinds	p. 131
Necessary Qualities and Necessary Membership	p. 132
Necessary Membership in Classes	p. 132
Necessary Qualities of Kinds	p. 132
My argument	p. 133
Objections	p. 134
Lawlike v. accidental generalizations	p. 137
Intensions and Essences of Narrow Classes and Kinds	p. 141
Definitions of Narrow Classes and Kinds	p. 143
Application to Universal Generalization in Modern Logic	p. 146
Causality	p. 151
Introduction	p. 151
The Spectrum of Views	p. 153
Necessary Causal Relations	p. 154
My Case	p. 154
An Objection	p. 155
Causal Tendency	p. 156
A Further Point	p. 156
The Necessity of Factual Truths About Deep Kinds, Narrow Classes and Individuals
Depth and Shallowness	p. 159
Depth of Individuals	p. 161
Depths of Classes	p. 161
Deep and Shallow Kinds: What They Are	p. 164
Preliminaries	p. 165
Definitions	p. 165
Names and descriptions	p. 168
Deep V. Shallow Kinds	p. 169
Paradigm Sets	p. 173
Introduction	p. 173
The question as to which qualities are included in the essence of a Deep Kind	p. 174
Deep Kinds in Particular: Summary of my Theory So Far	p. 176
Narrow Classes, Deep Kinds, and Shallow Kinds	p. 178
Deep and Shallow Kinds: the Case for Deep Kinds	p. 179
Premilinary Arguments and Over view	p. 179
That There are Deep Kinds	p. 180
We Can and Do Refer to Deep Kinds	p. 181
How we can know Deep Kinds: the answer to Locke's Problem	p. 182
That the alleged Deep Kind terms really are Deep Kind terms	p. 184
General remarks	p. 184
A concession	p. 187
That we have already been referring to such kinds	p. 188
Conclusions Regarding Definitions and Descriptions	p. 188
The Cognitive and Linguistic Divisions of Labor	p. 190
That My Doctrine of Paradigms is Correct	p. 190
The Naturalness of Kind-Concepts	p. 193
Problems with the Distinction	p. 195
Artifactual Kinds as Shallow Kinds	p. 195
Which Kinds Are Deep, and Which Are Deepest	p. 197
The Problem of the Objectivity and Dichotomous Nature of Depth	p. 198
The Problem of Reducibility	p. 200
Biological Kinds	p. 202
The depth of Linnaean taxa	p. 202
Dupre's objection to Putnam	p. 206
Parts of organisms and other biological kinds	p. 209
Doubtfully Deep Kinds	p. 210
Kinds Parasitic on Other Kinds	p. 210
Scientific Theories as Containing Deep Kind Truths	p. 211
Consequences for Dichotomies of Truth	p. 212
A Comparison of My Theory to Other Theories Having Implications for Deep Kinds	p. 221
The Problem of Rigid Designators	p. 223
The Need for Descriptions and Essentialism	p. 226
That the Causal Theory Needs to Be Supplemented with Essentialism in the Case of Deep Kinds	p. 226
That the Causal Theory Needs to be Supplemented with Essentialism Even in the Case of Individuals	p. 229
What is Not Implied by My Version of Essentialism	p. 230
Only one Right Classification	p. 231
Fundamental Qualities As Few and Hidden	p. 234
The Appearance/Essence Distinction: the Alleged Contingency or Uncertainty of the Phenomenal Qualities	p. 236
Introduction	p. 236
The alleged possibility that the phenomenal qualities are contingent	p. 238
The alleged possibility that the phenomenal qualities are uncertain	p. 239
A Privileged Role for Scientists	p. 240
The Theoretical Network Theory	p. 244
That Essentialism and the Causal Theory Do Not Require Supplementing by the Theoretical Network Theory	p. 244
That Essentialism does not require the Network Theory	p. 244
That the Causal Theory does not require the Network Theory	p. 248
The case of most Deep Kinds	p. 248
The case of individuals	p. 248
Essentialism, the Network Theory, and the Distinction Between Deep Kinds and Shallow Kinds	p. 250
The Factuality of Necessary Truths About Shallow Kinds
Introduction to Necessary Truths About Shallow Kinds	p. 261
Shallow Kinds and the Premises	p. 264
My Preliminary Argument for the Factuality of All Truths	p. 265
Against Mentalistic and Linguistic Interpretations of Shallow Kind Truths	p. 269
Whether Shallow Kind Truths are Mental or Linguistic Entities	p. 269
Whether Concepts and Definitions are Mental or Linguistic Entities	p. 270
Whether Shallow Kind Truths are Mental or Linguistic Entities Anyway	p. 271
Shallow Kinds Truths as Not About Mental R Linguistic Entities	p. 272
Whether Concepts and Definitions are Mental or Linguistic Entities	p. 273
Shallow Kind Truths as Not About Mental or Linguistic Entities	p. 273
Conceptual and definitional truths as not about mental or linguistic entities	p. 273
Why some people have thought that some truths are about mental entities, and why they are wrong	p. 275
Why people have thought that some truths are about linguistic entities, and why they are wrong	p. 275
My first general argument	p. 276
Whether definitional truths are disguised statements about language, and the internal/external distinction	p. 276
Logic as not about mental or linguistic entities	p. 279
De dicto and de re necessity	p. 279
Inconceivability and Necessity	p. 282
Shallow Kind Truths As Not Arbitrary	p. 283
What is Arbitrary About Concepts, Definitions, References, and Intensions	p. 284
Individuation	p. 285
Individuals and Narrow Classes	p. 286
Shallow Kinds	p. 287
Deep Kinds	p. 289
Remarks on classification	p. 289
Correctness and incorrectness of classifications	p. 292
Goodness and badness of classifications	p. 294
Our choice of terms	p. 295
Shallow Kind Truths As Not Arbitrary Anyway	p. 295
Conceptual and definitional truths as not arbitrary: definitions as declaratives v. definitions as assignments	p. 296
Logic as arbitrary	p. 301
That once a logic is chosen, logical truths are not arbitrary	p. 302
That choice in logic is not unlimited	p. 302
On Other Grounds for Believing in the Non-Factuality of Shallow Kind Truths	p. 311
That Some Truths are Too General to Have Content	p. 312
That Some Truths are Purely Formal	p. 313
The Confusion Between Vacuousness and Triviality	p. 314
On Other Grounds for Believing in the Non-Factuality of Necessary Truths	p. 317
That Some Truths are Non-Factual Because They are True no Matter How the World is	p. 318
The Confusion Between Factuality and Existentiality	p. 321
The Necessity of Shallow Kind Truths	p. 323
The Claim	p. 323
My Objection	p. 324
Conclusion	p. 330
The Necessity of Factual Truths About Shallow Kinds
The Necessity of Newton's Three Axioms of Motion	p. 333
My Position and Arguments for it	p. 334
Introduction	p. 334
Some Proposed Essential Qualities of Bodies	p. 335
My Proposed Essential Qualities of Bodies	p. 335
Impenetrability	p. 336
Intertness	p. 337
Force in general and inertial force	p. 340
Inertial resistance	p. 340
Force	p. 342
Inertial force	p. 346
Non-inertial forces	p. 347
Further attributes of inertial force	p. 348
Summary of the Essential Attributes of Bodies	p. 350
Body and Bodies	p. 351
Distinctive Qualities of Bodies	p. 354
The Derivation of Newton's Axioms from the Essential Qualities of Bodies	p. 354
The First Axiom	p. 355
The Second Axiom	p. 355
The Third Axiom	p. 354
Application to the Case of the Billiard Balls	p. 366
Objections	p. 367
Objection: This is not What 'Body' Means or What the Essence of Body is: I am Just Making up the Definition	p. 367
If the Laws are Necessary They Must be Non-Factual	p. 369
Objection: Relativity Theory and Quantum Physics Show Newton's Axiom to be Not True	p. 369
Other Objections	p. 373
Conclusions	p. 375
Index	p. 381
Table of Contents provided by Syndetics. All Rights Reserved.

Necessary Factual Truth

Shipping

How to return your order

Defective items

You Can Find This Book In

More in Philosophy

The Importance of Being Miserable

A short history of human happiness, and why sometimes it's good to feel bad

Utopia for Realists

And How We Can Get There

Letters from a Stoic

The Ancient Classic

On the Shortness of Life

The Stoic Classic

The Laws of Thought

The Quest for a Mathematical Theory of the Mind

Critical Thinking Skills

Effective Analysis, Argument and Reflection

Man's Search For Meaning

The Daily Stoic

366 Meditations on Wisdom, Perseverance, and the Art of Living: Featuring New Translations of Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius

12 Rules for Life

Antidote to Chaos

A Room of One's Own

Penguin Modern Classics

Nineteen Eighty-Four

Collins Classics

Phosphorescence

The inspiring bestseller and multi award-winning book from the author of Bright Shining

The Boy, the Mole, the Fox and the Horse: The Animated Story

Winner 2023 Oscar for best animated short

Manifest

Four Thousand Weeks

Embrace your limits. Change your life. Make your four thousand weeks count.

Discipline Is Destiny

The Power of Self-Control

The Golden Road

How Ancient India Transformed the World

How To Know a Person

The Art of Seeing Others Deeply and Being Deeply Seen

The Daily Dad

366 Meditations on Parenting, Love and Raising Great Kids

How to Feel

An Ancient Guide to Minding Our Emotions

How to Be Grateful

An Aztec Guide to the Art of Gratitude

Quantum 2.0

The Past, Present, and Future of Quantum Physics

Start With Why

How Great Leaders Inspire Everyone to Take Action

Meditations for Mortals

Four weeks to embrace your limitations and make time for what counts

This product is categorised by