| Preface | p. xi |
| Ideas of the Founding Fathers: Oligopoly Theory and Modern Game Theory | p. 1 |
| Game Theory Tools | p. 11 |
| Games in Normal Form and Nash Equilibrium | p. 12 |
| Supermodular Games and Lattice Programming | p. 16 |
| Lattices and Tarski's Theorem | p. 17 |
| Monotonicity of Optimal Solutions, Lattice Programming, and Complementarity | p. 23 |
| Supermodular Games | p. 31 |
| Existence Results for Quasi-increasing and Decreasing Best Replies | p. 39 |
| Quasi-increasing Best Replies in Symmetric Games | p. 39 |
| Decreasing Best Replies in n-Player Games | p. 42 |
| Mixed Strategies | p. 44 |
| Uniqueness | p. 47 |
| Stability | p. 49 |
| Dominance Solvability and Rationalizability | p. 49 |
| Tatonnement Stability | p. 50 |
| Incomplete Information and Bayesian Nash Equilibrium | p. 58 |
| Lattice Programming under Uncertainty | p. 58 |
| Information Structures and Signals | p. 61 |
| Bayesian Equilibrium | p. 65 |
| Summary | p. 69 |
| Exercises | p. 70 |
| Foundations of Partial Equilibrium Analysis | p. 75 |
| A Canonical Partial Equilibrium Model | p. 75 |
| Small Expenditure Shares and Small Income Effects | p. 77 |
| Consumer Surplus Analysis | p. 85 |
| Summary | p. 90 |
| Exercises | p. 90 |
| Quantity Competition: The Cournot Model | p. 93 |
| The Model and Existence of Equilibrium | p. 93 |
| Characterization of Smooth Cournot Games | p. 96 |
| Comparative Statics and Entry | p. 101 |
| Comparative Statics | p. 101 |
| Entry | p. 107 |
| Large Markets | p. 110 |
| Summary | p. 112 |
| Exercises | p. 113 |
| Price Competition: The Models of Bertrand and Edgeworth | p. 117 |
| Bertrand Competition | p. 117 |
| Bertrand-Edgeworth Competition | p. 123 |
| Rationing Rules and Contingent Demand | p. 124 |
| Equilibria: The Existence Problem | p. 126 |
| Mixed Strategies | p. 128 |
| Price Competition and the Cournot Model | p. 132 |
| Large Bertrand-Edgeworth Markets | p. 136 |
| Concluding Remark: The Rationale for Mixed Strategies | p. 137 |
| Summary | p. 138 |
| Exercises | p. 138 |
| Product Differentiation | p. 143 |
| Demand Systems | p. 144 |
| Quantity and Price Competition | p. 148 |
| Characterization and Comparison of Cournot and Bertrand Equilibria | p. 154 |
| Large Markets and Monopolistic Competition | p. 160 |
| Bertand-Edgeworth-Chamberlin Competition | p. 164 |
| Monopolistic Competition and Entry | p. 167 |
| Product Selection and Complementary Products | p. 176 |
| Summary | p. 177 |
| Exercises | p. 178 |
| Conjectures, Reactions, and Commitment | p. 185 |
| Conjectural Variations | p. 185 |
| Supply Functions | p. 187 |
| Capacity Determining Competitive Supply | p. 190 |
| Choice of Strategy Space | p. 192 |
| Discussion | p. 196 |
| Collusion and Facilitating Practices | p. 197 |
| Commitment and Pricing | p. 199 |
| The Stackelberg Model | p. 200 |
| Entry Deterrence, Limit Pricing, and Incumbency Advantages | p. 205 |
| A Taxonomy of Strategic Behavior | p. 213 |
| Summary | p. 219 |
| Exercises | p. 220 |
| Competition with Asymmetric Information | p. 225 |
| Static Competition with Incomplete Information | p. 225 |
| Existence of Bayesian Equilibrium | p. 229 |
| The Linear-Normal Model | p. 230 |
| Monopolistic Competition with Private Information | p. 234 |
| Information Sharing | p. 237 |
| Information Exchange in Oligopoly | p. 237 |
| Monopolistic Competition: Trade Associations and Disclosure Rules | p. 245 |
| Welfare Analysis | p. 248 |
| Strategic Information Transmission | p. 252 |
| Information Exchange, Collusion, and Mechanism Design | p. 262 |
| Mechanism Design and Collusion | p. 263 |
| Collusion in a Cournot Market | p. 264 |
| Collusion in a Large Market | p. 269 |
| Information Sharing in Large Markets | p. 273 |
| Commitment under Uncertainty and Information Manipulation | p. 277 |
| Uncertainty, Flexibility, and Commitment | p. 277 |
| Observability, Commitment, and Private Information | p. 279 |
| Limit Pricing and Signaling Distortions | p. 284 |
| Price Setting and Information Manipulation | p. 288 |
| Summary | p. 293 |
| Exercises | p. 294 |
| Repeated Interaction and Dynamics | p. 301 |
| Repeated Interaction and Collusion | p. 301 |
| Finite Horizon | p. 302 |
| Infinite Horizon | p. 305 |
| Uncertainty and Imperfect Monitoring | p. 313 |
| Collusive Pricing and Fluctuations | p. 316 |
| Private Information, Communication, and Collusion | p. 319 |
| Discussion | p. 322 |
| Dynamic Pricing and Commitment | p. 323 |
| Alternating Move Duopoly Games | p. 325 |
| A Taxonomy of Strategic Behavior with Adjustment Costs | p. 330 |
| Commitment and Pricing in Continuous Time | p. 336 |
| Summary | p. 347 |
| Exercises | p. 348 |
| Epilogue | p. 353 |
| Notes | p. 359 |
| References | p. 385 |
| Index | p. 415 |
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