The Origins of These Essays ix
Introduction 1
Part One: Reference, Propositions, and Propositional Attitudes 31
Essay One: Direct Reference, Propositional Attitudes, and Semantic Content 33
Essay Two: Why Propositions Can't Be Sets of Truth-Supporting Circumstances 72
Essay Three: Belief and Mental Representation 81
Essay Four: Attitudes and Anaphora 111
Part Two: Modality 137
Essay Five: The Modal Argument: Wide Scope and Rigidified Descriptions 139
Essay Six: The Philosophical Significance of the Kripkean Necessary A Posteriori 165
Essay Seven: Knowledge of Manifest Natural Kinds 189
Essay Eight: Understanding Assertion 211
Essay Nine: Ambitious Two-Dimensionalism 243
Essay Ten: Actually 277
Part Three: Truth and Vagueness 301
Essay Eleven: What Is a Theory of Truth? 303
Essay Twelve: Understanding Deflationism 323
Essay Thirteen: Higher-Order Vagueness for Partially Defined Predicates 340
Essay Fourteen: The Possibility of Partial Definition 362
Part Four: Kripke, Wittgenstein, and Following a Rule 383
Essay Fifteen: Skepticism about Meaning: Indeterminacy, Normativity, and the Rule-Following Paradox 385
Essay Sixteen: Facts, Truth Conditions, and the Skeptical Solution to the Rule-Following Paradox 416
Index 457