Theoretical Issues | |
The Political Economy of Government Debt: A Survey | |
Introduction | |
The Intertemporal Government Budget Constraint | |
The Effects of Government Debt | |
Positive Theories of Public Debt | |
Long Term Debt Strategy: A Survey | |
Introduction | |
Characterizing Public Debt | |
The Effect of Public Debt on the Economy | |
Normative Aspects of Debt Policy | |
Concluding Remarks | |
The Politics of Intergenerational Redistribution | |
Introduction | |
The Model | |
The Economic Equilibrium | |
Voting on Debt Repudiation | |
Equilibrium Intergenerational Redistribution | |
Concluding Remarks | |
Social Security and the Deficit in the US: A Political Economy Approach | |
Introduction | |
Social Security and the Budget: Some Background Facts | |
The 1983 SS Fixup and the Role of the Trust Fund as a Commitment Device | |
A Model of Congressional Behavior with Respect to SS and the Rest of the Budget | |
Interpretation of Past Events in Light of the Model and its Implications for the Current Policy Debate and the Future | |
Concluding Reflections | |
Endogenous Technology, Budgetary Regimes and Public Debt | |
Introduction | |
Endogenous Technical Change | |
Private and Public Production of Technology | |
Macroeconomic Model | |
Fiscal Policy, Productivity Growth and Budgetary Regimes | |
Choice of Regime: Some Political Aspects | |
Conclusion | |
Economic and Monetary Union in Europe and Constraints on National Budgetary Policies | |
Introduction | |
EMU: A New Environment for Budgetary Policy | |
Monetary Union and Prospects for Budget Discipline | |
Intergenerational Equity and Intertemporal Efficiency | |
Stabilization Policy | |
Concluding Comments | |
Monetary Discipline and the Real Value of Government Debt: The Case for an Independent Eurofed | |
Introduction | |
Competition among the Treasuries and Central Banks of a Monetary Union | |
European Monetary Union with an Independent Central Bank | |
Reasons for Joining the EMS. Conclusion | |
Empirical Applications | |
The Determinants of the Ricardian Equivalence in the OECD Countries | |
Introduction | |
Testing Ricardian Equivalence with Time-Series Cross-Section Data | |
Ricardian Equivalence Indicators for Each Country | |
Conclusions | |
Debt Neutrality, Finite Horizons, and Private Savings Behavior | |
Introduction | |
Public Debt Neutrality in a Finite-Horizon Economy | |
Debt Neutrality and Private Savings Behavior | |
Conclusion | |
Management of the Nominal Public Debt: Theory and Applications | |
Introduction | |
The Model | |
Public Debt Management: Numerical Simulations | |
Debt Maturity in Italy, Ireland, and the United States | |
Concluding Remarks | |
Interest Rates and Government Debt: Are the Linkages Global rather than National? | |
Introduction | |
General Background | |
The Growth of Public Debt in OECD Countries | |
Debt and Interest Rates: Empirical Results | |
Concluding Remarks | |
Self-Correcting Deficits: A New Lesson in Functional Finance | |
Introduction | |
Theory and Hypotheses | |
Description of Equations | |
Characteristics of the Models | |
Conclusions | |
Positive Theories of Public Debt: Some Evidence for Germany | |
Introduction | |
The Tax Smoothing Theory of Public Debt | |
Political Determinants of Government Budget Deficits | |
Testing the Tax Smoothing Hypothesis of Public Debt for the FRG | |
Testing for Political Determinants of Government Debt Growth in the FRG | |
Some Concluding Comments | |
Suggestions for a New Set of Fiscal Indicators | |
Introduction | |
The Uses and Abuses of the CAB | |
Constructing Indicators: A General Strategy | |
Indicators o | |
Table of Contents provided by Publisher. All Rights Reserved. |