| Acknowledgments | p. xiii |
| Introduction | p. 1 |
| Organization of the Book | p. 3 |
| The Theory of Choice | p. 6 |
| Finite Sets of Actions and Outcomes | p. 7 |
| Continuous Choice Spaces | p. 11 |
| Utility Theory | p. 18 |
| Utility Representations on Continuous Choice Spaces | p. 20 |
| Spatial Preferences | p. 21 |
| Exercises | p. 25 |
| Choice Under Uncertainty | p. 27 |
| The Finite Case | p. 27 |
| Risk Preferences | p. 38 |
| Learning | p. 46 |
| Critiques of Expected Utility Theory | p. 51 |
| Time Preferences | p. 57 |
| Exercises | p. 62 |
| Social Choice Theory | p. 66 |
| The Open Search | p. 66 |
| Preference Aggregation Rules | p. 6 |
| Collective Choice | p. 76 |
| Manipulation of Choice Functions | p. 82 |
| Exercises | p. 85 |
| Games in the Normal Form | p. 87 |
| The Normal Form | p. 89 |
| Solutions to Normal Form Games | p. 93 |
| Application: The Hotelling Model of Political Competition | p. 101 |
| Existence of Nash Equilibria | p. 107 |
| Dominance and Mixed Strategies | p. 113 |
| Calculating Nash Equilibria | p. 115 |
| Application: Interest Group Contributions | p. 117 |
| Application: International Externalities | p. 119 |
| Computing Equilibria with Constrained Optimization | p. 121 |
| Proving the Existence of Nash Equilibria | p. 123 |
| Comparative Statics | p. 126 |
| Refining Nash Equilibria | p. 138 |
| Application: Private Provision of Public Goods | p. 140 |
| Exercises | p. 145 |
| Bayesian Games in the Normal Form | p. 150 |
| Formal Definitions | p. 152 |
| Application: Trade Restrictions | p. 154 |
| Application: Jury Voting | p. 156 |
| Application: Jury Voting with a Continuum of Signals | p. 159 |
| Application: Public Goods and Incomplete Information | p. 161 |
| Application: Uncertainty About Candidate Preferences | p. 164 |
| Application: Campaigns, Contests, and Auctions | p. 166 |
| Existence of Bayesian Nash Equilibria | p. 168 |
| Exercises | p. 169 |
| Extensive Form Games | p. 171 |
| Backward Induction | p. 175 |
| Dynamic Games of Complete but Imperfect Information | p. 177 |
| The Single-Deviation Principle | p. 184 |
| A Digression on Subgame Perfection and Perfect Equilibria | p. 185 |
| Application: Agenda Control | p. 186 |
| Application: A Model of Power Transitions | p. 192 |
| Application: A Model of Transitions to Democracy | p. 193 |
| Application: A Model of Coalition Formation | p. 197 |
| Exercises | p. 201 |
| Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information | p. 204 |
| Perfect Bayesian Equilibria | p. 208 |
| Signaling Games | p. 214 |
| Application: Entry Deterrence in Elections | p. 219 |
| Application: Information and Legislative Organization | p. 227 |
| Application: Informational Lobbying | p. 232 |
| Refinements of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium | p. 236 |
| Exercises | p. 248 |
| Repeated Games | p. 251 |
| The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma | p. 252 |
| The Grim Trigger Equilibrium | p. 253 |
| Tit-for-Tat Strategies | p. 256 |
| Intermediate Punishment Strategies | p. 258 |
| The Folk Theorem | p. 260 |
| Application: Interethnic Cooperation | p. 263 |
| Application: Trade Wars | p. 269 |
| Exercises | p. 273 |
| Bargaining Theory | p. 275 |
| The Nash Bargaining Solution | p. 275 |
| Noncooperative Bargaining | p. 281 |
| Majority-Rule Bargaining Under a Closed Rule | p. 286 |
| The Baron-Ferejohn Model Under Open Rule | p. 291 |
| Bargaining with Incomplete Information | p. 294 |
| Application: Veto Bargaining | p. 296 |
| Application: Crisis Bargaining | p. 307 |
| Exercises | p. 318 |
| Mechanism Design and Agency Theory | p. 320 |
| An Example | p. 321 |
| The Mechanism Design Problem | p. 323 |
| Application: Polling | p. 326 |
| Auction Theory | p. 328 |
| Application: Electoral Contests and All-Pay Auctions* | p. 334 |
| Incentive Compatibility and Individual Rationality | p. 339 |
| Constrained Mechanism Design | p. 342 |
| Mechanism Design and Signaling Games | p. 361 |
| Exercises | p. 366 |
| Mathematical Appendix | p. 369 |
| Mathematical Statements and Proofs | p. 370 |
| Sets and Functions | p. 372 |
| The Real Number System | p. 376 |
| Points and Sets | p. 378 |
| Continuity of Functions | p. 380 |
| Correspondences | p. 383 |
| Calculus | p. 384 |
| Probability Theory | p. 404 |
| Bibliography | p. 417 |
| Index | p. 423 |
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