Preface.
Acknowledgements.
Part I: Static Oligopoly Theory: .
Introduction.
1. Capacity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot
Outcomes: David M. Kreps (Stanford University) and Jose A.
Sheinkman (University of Chicago).
2. The Fat-Cat Effect, the Puppy Dog Ploy and the Lean Hungry
Look: Drew Fudenberg (Harvard University) and Jean Tirole
(Massachusetts Institute of Technology).
Part II: Repeated Games and Oligopoly Theory: .
Introduction.
3. Noncooperative Collusion Under Imperfect Price Information:
Edward J. Green (University of Minnesota) and Robert H. Porter
(Northwestern University).
4. A Supergame-Theoretic Model of Price Wars During Booms: Julio
J. Rotemberg (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) and Garth
Saloner (Stanford University).
5. Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behaviour: B. Douglas
Bernheim (Stanford University) and Michael D. Whinston
(Northwestern University).
Part III: Product Differentiation: .
Introduction.
6. On Hotelling's Stability of Competition: Claude
d'Aspremont, J. Jaskkold Gabszewicz and Jacques-Francois Thisse
(all at Universite Catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations
Research and Econometrics (CORE)).
7. Relaxing Price Competition Through Product Differentiation:
Avner Shaked (University of Bonn) and John Sutton (London School of
Economics).
8. Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity:
Avinash K. Dixit (Princeton University) and Joseph E. Stiglitz
(Stanford University).
Part IV: Empirical Analysis of Oligopoly: .
Introduction.
9. The Oligopoly Solution is Identified: Timothy F. Bresnahan
(Stanford University).
10. A Study of Cartel Stability: The Joint Executive Committee,
1880-1886: Robert H. Porter (Northwestern University).
11. Automobile Prices in Market Equilibrium: Steven Berry (Yale
University), James Levinsohn (University of Michigan), and Ariel
Pakes (Harvard University).
Part V: Entry: .
Introduction.
12. The Role of Investment in Entry Deterrence: Avinash Dixit
(Princeton University).
13. Contracts as a Barrier to Entry: Philippe Aghion (Harvard
University) and Patrick Bolton (Princeton University).
14. Free Entry and Social Inefficiency: N. Gregory Mankiw
(Harvard University) and Michael D. Whinston (Northwestern
University).
15. Selection and Evolution of Industry: Boyan Jovanovic (New
York University).
Part VI: Technology and Dynamics: .
Introduction.
16. Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of Monopoly Power:
Richard J. Gilbert (University of California-Berkeley) and David M.
G. Newberry (Cambridge University).
17. Uncertain Innovation and the Persistence of Monopoly:
Jennifer F. Reinganum (Vanderbilt University).
18. The Learning Curve, Market Dominance, and Predatory Pricing:
Luis M. B. Cabral (London Business School) and Michael H. Riordan
(Boston University).
19. Preemption and Rent Equalization in the Adoption of New
Technology: Drew Fudenberg (Harvard University) and Jean Tirole
(Massachusetts Institute of Technology).
Part VII: Asymmetric Information:.
Introduction.
20. Reputation and Imperfect Information: David M. Kreps
(Stanford University) and Robert Wilson (Stanford University).
21. Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: Paul
Milgrom (Stanford University) and John Roberts (Stanford
University).
22. Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality: Paul
Milgrom (Stanford University) and John Roberts (Stanford
University).
Index.
