Hart Studies in Competition Law

1 General Introduction
2 The Decentralisation of EU Competition Law 6
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Shared Administration
2.3 Sanctioning Autonomy
2.4 Cooperation and Coordination
2.5 Conclusion
3 The Economics of Decentralisation
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Economic Considerations in the Allocation of Competences
3.3 Transaction Costs and Diseconomies of Scale
3.4 Information Advantages
3.5 Accommodating Domestic Preferences
3.6 Regulatory Competition
3.7 Regulatory Innovation
3.8 Conclusion
4 Uncovering EU Sanctioning Principles
4.1 Introduction
4.2 EU Principles in the National Legal Order
4.3 Sanctioning Principles in Articles 101 and 102 TFEU
4.4 Sanctioning Principles in the Free Movement Rights
4.5 Sanctioning Principles in the Fundamental Rights
4.6 Sanctioning Principles in the Duty of Sincere Cooperation
4.7 Conclusion
5 The Development of Domestic Sanctioning Powers
5.1 Introduction
5.2 Institutional Enforcement Frameworks
5.3 Interim Measures
5.4 Early Resolution Measures
5.5 Declaratory Findings
5.6 Reparatory Sanctions
5.7 Pecuniary Sanctions
5.8 Custodial Sanctions
5.9 Disqualification Orders
5.10 Conclusion
6 Economies and Diseconomies in the Division of Sanctioning Competences
6.1 Introduction
6.2 Cost-Reducing Sanctioning Principles and Convergence Tendencies
6.3 Domestic Preferences and the Efficient Use of Enforcement Expenditures
6.4 Innovation through Decentralisation
7 General Conclusions
7.1 Sanctioning Principles, Convergence Tendencies and Enforcement Costs
7.2 Reflections and Recommendations