| The American Congress: Modern Trends | |
| What Is Wrong with the American Political System? | p. 3 |
| A Reassessment of Who's to Blame: A Positive Case for the Public Evaluation of Congress | p. 7 |
| Between the Campaigns: Public Approval and Disapproval of Government | p. 16 |
| Representation and Lawmaking in Congress: The Constitutional and Historical Context | |
| U.S. Constitution, Articles I, II, III, and Amendments | p. 31 |
| The Federalist, Nos. 10 and 51 | p. 43 |
| U.S. House Members in Their Constituencies: An Exploration | p. 51 |
| Collective vs. Dyadic Representation in Congress | p. 88 |
| Congressional Elections and Policy Alignments | |
| Elbridge Gerry's Salamander: The Electoral Consequences of the Reapportionment Revolution - Excerpts | p. 101 |
| Strategic Politicians and the Dynamics of U.S. House Elections, 1946-1986 | p. 113 |
| Congress: The Electoral Connection | p. 126 |
| Members, Goals, Resources, and Strategies | |
| Senate Representation and Coalition Building in Distributive Politics | p. 141 |
| Risk-Bearing and Progressive Ambition: The Case of Members of the United States House of Representatives | p. 152 |
| Issue Politics in Congress - Excerpts | p. 162 |
| Parties and Leaders | |
| Institutional Context and Leadership Style: The House from Cannon to Rayburn | p. 177 |
| Setting the Agenda | p. 193 |
| Party Influence in Congress | p. 200 |
| The Standing Committees | |
| Distributive and Partisan Issues in Agriculture Policy in the 104th House | p. 213 |
| Principals, Goals, Dimensionality, and Congressional Committees | p. 221 |
| Nonlegislative Hearings and Policy Change in Congress | p. 230 |
| The Rules of the Legislative Game | |
| Sample of a Special Rule | p. 243 |
| Sample of a Unanimous Consent Agreement | p. 245 |
| On the Effects of Legislative Rules | p. 246 |
| The Partisan Basis of Procedural Choice: Allocating Parliamentary Rights in the House, 1789-1990 | p. 256 |
| The Evolution of Agenda-Setting Institutions in Congress: Path Dependency in House and Senate Institutional Development | p. 265 |
| The Floor and Voting | |
| Greasing the Wheels: Using Pork Barrel Projects to Build Majority Coalitions in Congress - Excerpt | p. 279 |
| Models of Legislative Voting | p. 292 |
| Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking | p. 307 |
| Congress and the President | |
| Presidential Veto Messages | p. 319 |
| Presidential Signing Statement | p. 322 |
| Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of Negative Power | p. 324 |
| The Dynamics of Legislative Gridlock, 1947-1996 | p. 343 |
| The Politics of Shared Power: Congress and the Executive - Excerpt | p. 354 |
| Conscience of a Conservative | p. 374 |
| Congress and the Courts | |
| Senate Voting on Supreme Court Nominees: A Neoinstitutional Model | p. 383 |
| From Abe Fortas to Zoe Baird: Why Some Presidential Nominations Fail in the Senate | p. 389 |
| Congress, Lobbyists, and Interest Groups | |
| Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees | p. 401 |
| "Legislative Lobbying" - Excerpt | p. 414 |
| Congress and Budget Politics | |
| Appropriations in the Republican Era | p. 429 |
| Pet Projects' Veil Is Only Partly Lifted: Lawmakers Find Other Paths to Special-Interest Funding | p. 436 |
| Further Readings on Congressional Politics | |
| Introduction to the Spatial Theory of Legislating | p. 441 |
| The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power | p. 449 |
| The Return to Equilibrium: Controlling Legislative Agendas | p. 460 |
| Table of Contents provided by Ingram. All Rights Reserved. |
