Acknowledgments | |
Self-Consciousness and the Body: An Interdisciplinary Introduction | |
Self-Consciousness and the Body | |
Substantive Self-Consciousness | |
Representing Objects, Other Persons, and Oneself | |
Self and the Environment | |
Bodily Awareness | |
The Senses of 'Proprioception' | |
Representations of the Body | |
Phenomenology and Spatial Content | |
Representation, Phenomenology, and Substantive Self-Consciousness | |
I-as-Subject, Ownership, and Elusiveness of Self | |
References | |
The Body Image and Self-Consciousness | |
Reference and Conceptual Role | |
Body Image and Body Schema | |
The Token-Reflexive Rule | |
Psychological Structure over Time | |
The Social Dimension of Causal Role | |
Acknowledgments | |
Infants' Understanding of People and Things: From Body Imitation to Folk Psychology | |
Early Understanding of Physical Objects | |
Identity | |
Human Bodies as Objects | |
The Problem of Imitation | |
Innate Imitation: Strong Nativism | |
The Intentional Nature of Imitation | |
The Interpretive Nature of Imitation | |
Infants' Conception of Persons | |
Identity for Human Individuals | |
Developing Objectivity about Persons | |
Developing Subjectivity for Persons: Early Folk Psychology | |
Concepts of the Self and the Other | |
Acknowledgments | |
Notes | |
References | |
Persons, Animals, and Bodies | |
Animalism and the Source of the Problem | |
Another Difficult Case | |
Some Responses | |
The Possibility of''Brain Zaps" | |
Split Brains | |
A General Argument | |
A Hybrid Account | |
Some Difficulties | |
Conclusion | |
Acknowledgments | |
Notes | |
References | |
An Ecological Perspective on the Origins of Self | |
The Ecological Approach to Self | |
Some Implications of the Ecological Approach to the Origins of Self | |
Visual Proprioception and Posture | |
Direct Perception and the Interpersonal Self | |
Direct Perception and the Core Sense of Self | |
Note | |
References | |
Objectivity, Causality, and Agency | |
The Pragmatist Argument | |
Objects as Causes | |
Bodily Power | |
The Harmony Requirement | |
Acknowledgments | |
Notes | |
References | |
At Two with Nature: Agency and the Development of Self-World Dualism | |
Weakening the Piagetian Thesis | |
What Agency Gives Us | |
Object Occlusion and Object Permanence | |
Self-World Dualism and a Conception of Other Minds | |
Acknowledgments | |
Notes | |
References | |
Ecological Perception and the Notion of a Nonconceptual Point of View | |
The Ecological View of Perception | |
Ecological Perception and the Notion of Point of View | |
Awareness of Action and Points of View | |
Conclusion | |
Acknowledgments | |
References | |
Proprioception and the Body Image | |
Is Proprioception a True Perceiving? | |
Proprioception and the Attention | |
Proprioceptive Attending in Physical Instrumental Action | |
Proprioceptive Attending and the Whole Body | |
The Short-Term Body Image | |
The Distinction Between Short-Term and Long-Term Body Image | |
Three Different Kinds of Short-Term Body Image | |
The Constitutive Raw Material of Body Images | |
The Long-Term Body Image | |
A Conceptual Preamble | |
The Origin of the Concept of a Long-Term Body Image | |
Filling in the Concept of the Long-Term Image | |
The Type and Ontological Status of the Long-Term Body Image | |
Is the Long-Term Body Image an A Priori Postulate? | |
Notes | |
References | |
Awareness of One's Own Body: An Attentional Theory of Its Nature, Development, and Brain Basis | |
Impairments of Bodily Awareness | |
When Does One Attend to the Relative Disposition of One's | |
How Does One Focus Attention on a Body Part? | |
Why Are There No Local Autotopagnosias? | |
Is There a General Autotopagnosia? | |
Opposing-Processor Imbalance and Impaired Body Awareness | |
What Explains the Indifference and Denial Syndromes? | |
To What Does One Attend When One Attends to the Body? | |
A Body Scheme Acquisition Device? | |
A Body-Image-Acquisition Device | |
The Self as Emerging from Background Body Sensation | |
Body Sensation, Episodic Memory, and the Self | |
How Are Body Parts Represented? | |
Conclusions | |
References | |
Body Schema and Intentionality | |
Body Image and Body Schema: A Clarification of Some | |
Intentionality and the Prenoetic Body: Husserl and Merleau-Ponty | |
Body Schema and Physiology | |
Recent Psychological Studies and Implications for Cognitive Science | |
Acknowledgments | |
Notes | |
References | |
Living without Touch and Peripheral Information about Body Position and Movement: Studies with Deaff... | |
Touch, Proprioception, and the Peripheral Nervous System | |
The Physiological Loss in I.W. and G.L. | |
Case Histories | |
Strategies for Everyday Movement | |
Perceptual Frames of Reference | |
The Body-Schema Problem | |
The Problem of Morphokinesis versus Topokinesis | |
Production of Force and Corollary Discharge? | |
Some Consequences of Deafferentation on One's Approach to the World | |
Body Language | |
Views of Self and of Body Image | |
Unavoidable Limitations | |
Conclusions | |
Acknowledgments | |
References | |
Bodily Awareness: A Sense of Ownership | |
A Phenomenological Sense of Ownership | |
The Sole Object of Awareness | |
Bodily Awareness and Self-Awareness | |
Acknowledgments | |
Notes | |
Bibliography | |
Bodily Awareness and the Self | |
Evans's Antidote to Cartesianism | |
A Cartesian Response to Evans | |
The Nature and Spatial Content of Bodily Awareness: A More Direct Objection to Cartesian Dualism | |
Extending the Argument | |
A Cartesian Last Stand | |
Experience of Ownership and the Subject as Object | |
Acknowledgments | |
Notes | |
References | |
Introspection and Bodily Self-Ascription | |
Introduction | |
The Elusiveness Thesis | |
Proprioception and Appropriation | |
The Body and the Self | |
Acknowledgments | |
Notes | |
References | |
Consciousness and the Self | |
Points of View | |
The Ecological Self and Consciousness | |
Perceptual Consciousness and Attention | |
Implicit Self-Consciousness and Externality | |
Acknowledgments | |
References | |
Contributors | |
Index | |
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