Preface | p. xiii |
Decision Theory and Human Behavior | p. 1 |
Beliefs, Preferences, and Constraints | p. 4 |
The Meaning of Rational Action | p. 6 |
Why Are Preferences Consistent? | p. 7 |
Time Inconsistency | p. 8 |
Bayesian Rationality and Subjective Priors | p. 11 |
The Biological Basis for Expected Utility | p. 16 |
The Allais and Ellsberg Paradoxes | p. 16 |
Risk and the Shape of the Utility Function | p. 18 |
Prospect Theory | p. 21 |
Heuristics and Biases in Decision Making | p. 26 |
Game Theory: Basic Concepts | p. 30 |
The Extensive Form | p. 30 |
The Normal Form | p. 33 |
Mixed Strategies | p. 34 |
Nash Equilibrium | p. 35 |
The Fundamental Theorem of Game Theory | p. 36 |
Solving for Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibria | p. 37 |
Throwing Fingers | p. 38 |
The Battle of the Sexes | p. 38 |
The Hawk-Dove Game | p. 39 |
The Prisoner's Dilemma | p. 40 |
Alice, Bob, and the Choreographer | p. 41 |
An Efficiency-Enhancing Choreographer | p. 43 |
The Correlated Equilibrium Solution Concept | p. 44 |
Game Theory and Human Behavior | p. 45 |
Self- and Other-Regarding Preferences | p. 46 |
Methodological Issues in Behavioral Game Theory | p. 49 |
An Anonymous Market Exchange | p. 52 |
The Rationality of Altruistic Giving | p. 54 |
Conditional Altruistic Cooperation | p. 56 |
Altruistic Punishment | p. 57 |
Strong Reciprocity in the Labor Market | p. 59 |
Altruistic Third-Party Punishment | p. 61 |
Altruism and Cooperation in Groups | p. 64 |
Inequality Aversion | p. 68 |
The Trust Game | p. 71 |
Character Virtues | p. 73 |
The Situational Character of Preferences | p. 75 |
The Dark Side of Altruistic Cooperation | p. 77 |
Norms of Cooperation: Cross-Cultural Variation | p. 78 |
Rationalizability and Common Knowledge of Rationality | p. 83 |
Epistemic Games | p. 83 |
A Simple Epistemic Game | p. 86 |
An Epistemic Battle of the Sexes | p. 87 |
Dominated and Iteratedly Dominated Strategies | p. 88 |
Eliminating Weakly Dominated Strategies | p. 89 |
Rationalizable Strategies | p. 90 |
Eliminating Strongly Dominated Strategies | p. 92 |
Common Knowledge of Rationality | p. 93 |
Rationalizability and Common Knowledge of Rationality | p. 94 |
The Beauty Contest | p. 94 |
The Traveler's Dilemma | p. 95 |
The Modified Traveler's Dilemma | p. 96 |
Global Games | p. 98 |
CKR Is an Event, Not a Premise | p. 100 |
Extensive Form Rationalizability | p. 102 |
Backward Induction and Dominated Strategies | p. 102 |
Subgame Perfection | p. 104 |
Subgame Perfection and Incredible Threats | p. 105 |
The Surprise Examination | p. 105 |
The Common Knowledge of Logicality Paradox | p. 106 |
The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma | p. 107 |
The Centipede Game | p. 108 |
CKR Fails Off the Backward Induction Path | p. 110 |
How to Play the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma | p. 112 |
The Modal Logic of Knowledge | p. 114 |
Backward Induction and Extensive Form CKR | p. 115 |
Rationality and Extensive Form CKR | p. 118 |
On the Nonexistence of CKR | p. 119 |
The Mixing Problem: Purification and Conjectures | p. 121 |
Why Play Mixed Strategies? | p. 121 |
Harsanyi's Purification Theorem | p. 123 |
A Reputational Model of Honesty and Corruption | p. 125 |
Purifying Honesty and Corruption | p. 128 |
Epistemic Games: Mixed Strategies as Conjectures | p. 128 |
Resurrecting the Conjecture Approach to Purification | p. 129 |
Bayesian Rationality and Social Epistemology | p. 132 |
The Sexes: From Battle to Ballet | p. 133 |
The Choreographer Trumps Backward Induction | p. 134 |
Property Rights and Correlated Equilibrium | p. 135 |
Convention as Correlated Equilibrium | p. 136 |
Correlated Strategies and Correlated Equilibria | p. 136 |
Correlated Equilibrium and Bayesian Rationality | p. 138 |
The Social Epistemology of Common Priors | p. 139 |
The Social Epistemology of Common Knowledge | p. 141 |
Social Norms | p. 143 |
Game Theory and the Evolution of | |
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