Part 1 Theoretical foundations of executive pay: theory of the firm - managerial behaviour, agency costs and ownership structure, Michael C. Jensen, William H. Meckling; moral hazard and observability, Bengt Holmstrom; agency problems and theory of the firm, Eugene F. Fama; rank-order tournaments as optimum labour contracts, Edward P. Lazear, Sherwin Rosen; moral hazard in teams, Bengt Holmstrom; authority, control, and the distribution of earnings, sherwin Rosen; an analysis of the principal-agent problem, Sanford J. Grossman, Oliver D. Hart. Part 2 Executive compensation and company performance: managerial pay and corporate performance, Wilbur G. Lewellen, Blaine Huntsman; corporate performance and managerial remuneration - an empirical analysis, Kevin J. Murphy; executive compensation, management turnover, and firm performance - an empirical investigation, Anne T. Coughlan, Ronald M. Schmidt; performance pay and top-management incentives, Michael C. Jensen, Kevin J. Murphy; contracts and the market for executives, Sherwin Rosen; risk aversion, performance pay, and the principal-agent problem, Joseph G. Haubrich. Part 3 Relative performance measures: an empirical investigation of the relative performance evaluation of corporate executives, Rick Antle, Abbie Smith; relative performance evaluation of chief executive officers, Robert Gibbons, Kevin J. Murphy. Part 4 Determinants of executive compensation: incentives, learning, and compensation - a theoretical and empirical investigation of managerial labour contracts, Kevin J. Murphy; executive compensation and executive incentive problems - an empirical analysis, wilbur Lewellen et al; CEO compensation as tournament and social comparison - a tale of two theories, Charles A. O'Reilly et al; executive pay and firm performance, Jonathan s. Leonard; portfolio considerations in valuing executive compensation, Richard A. Lambert et al;; optimal incentive contracts in the presence of career concerns - theory and evidence, Robert Gibbons, Kevin J. Murphy; do corporations award CEO stock options effectively? David Yermack. Part 5 The effects of CEO pay: executive motivations, earnings, and consequent equity performance, Robert Tempest Masson; the impact of long-range managerial compensation plans on shareholders, James A. Brickley et al; market reaction to short-term executive compensation plan adoption, Hassan Tehranian, James F. Waegelein; managerial incentives and corporate investment and financing decisions, Anup Agrawal, Gershon N. Mandelker; does performance-based managerial compensation affect corporate performance? John M. Abowd. (part contents).