Acknowledgments | p. ix |
A Framework for Analysis of the Antitrust-Intellectual Property Intersection | p. 1 |
Introduction | p. 1 |
The Factual Scope of the Interface | p. 2 |
The Historical Context of the Antitrust-IP Cusp | p. 4 |
Theoretical Aspects of the Interface | p. 6 |
Policy Goals of the Two Institutions | p. 6 |
The Methodologies of the Two Institutions | p. 16 |
Some Thoughts about Colliding Goals and Methods | p. 25 |
Conclusion | p. 26 |
The Austrian Economics Solution and the Property Narrative | p. 38 |
Introduction | p. 38 |
The Austrian Economics View of Competition | p. 38 |
Austrian Economics: a Pragmatic Doctrine | p. 39 |
The Inherent Dynamic Nature of 'Austrian' Competition | p. 40 |
The Role of Entrepreneurship in Austrian Competition | p. 44 |
On the Fallacies of the Neoclassical Competition Model | p. 45 |
Notions Narrowing the IP-Antitrust Conflict | p. 48 |
Austrian Economics Drawing Competition and Innovation Together | p. 48 |
The Faults of the IP Mechanism | p. 49 |
The Property Narrative of the Antitrust-IP Conflict | p. 52 |
The Property Account of Antitrust | p. 52 |
The Property Account of Intellectual Property | p. 60 |
Implications of the Property Narrative | p. 64 |
Some Thoughts Arising From the Property Narratives Conflict | p. 67 |
The Dynamic Antitrust Analysis Model | p. 80 |
Introduction | p. 80 |
The Untold Austrian Assumptions | p. 81 |
Dynamic (Time) Notions | p. 84 |
Uncertainty (Ignorance) Notions | p. 87 |
Prerequisite Circumstantial Assumptions Distinguished from End Results of the Competitive Process | p. 89 |
The Dynamic Analysis | p. 90 |
Different Monopoly Concepts | p. 90 |
Dynamic Antitrust Analysis | p. 92 |
Placing the Property Narratives within the Dynamic Antitrust Paradigm | p. 103 |
Intellectual Property Rights | p. 104 |
The Antitrust Rights | p. 104 |
Conclusion | p. 108 |
Application of the Dynamic Model on Refusal to License Intellectual Property (Magill) | p. 118 |
Introduction | p. 119 |
Preliminary Notions | p. 123 |
Refusal to Deal versus Refusal to License | p. 123 |
The Distinction between Existence of an IPR and Its Exercise | p. 124 |
Refusal To License: the Magill Case | p. 126 |
Magill Case: Findings of Fact | p. 127 |
Magill Case: Findings of Law | p. 129 |
Magill Case: Dynamic Analysis | p. 133 |
Fitting the Dynamic Analysis into the Framework of EC Law | p. 146 |
Economic Dependence versus Insulation from Competition | p. 147 |
Advantages of Dynamic Analysis in Refusal to License Contexts | p. 149 |
Conclusion | p. 153 |
Application of the Dynamic Model in Network Industries (the Dell Case) | p. 166 |
Introduction | p. 166 |
Introducing Network Industries, their Competitive Patterns and Standards | p. 166 |
Existing Antitrust Jurisprudence on Network Industries | p. 169 |
Applicability of Antitrust Policy | p. 170 |
Static Market Power | p. 171 |
Lock-in Arguments | p. 171 |
Summary | p. 173 |
Dynamic Evaluation of the Effects of Standards on the Competitive Process | p. 173 |
Arguments on Pro-competitive Aspects of Standards | p. 174 |
Arguments on Anticompetitive Effects of Standards | p. 179 |
Summary | p. 182 |
From Theory to Practice: the Dell Case | p. 183 |
The Dell Case Facts | p. 183 |
Dell: Legal Setting of the Complaint | p. 185 |
The Dell Case: a Dynamic Analysis | p. 189 |
A Review of the FTC Dell Decision | p. 189 |
Dynamic Analysis of the Dell Fact Pattern | p. 191 |
Conclusion | p. 199 |
Postscript | p. 208 |
Bibliography | p. 210 |
Index | p. 239 |
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