Value Judgement

a fine contribution to an active field ... metaphysical and ethical, logical and illuminating, argued but not argumentative, above all intelligent but also wise ... a fine and finely restrained display of a maturity that has no need to show off. While the concision of the text spares the reader's time, the range of reference of the endnotes may occupy a student with time enough and to spare. Little is imposed, and much is made accessible. Oxford moral philosophy is in safe hands.' A. W. Price, Philosophical Books `Value Judgement is remarkable in its critique of the dubious dualisms that nourish moral philosophy: reason and desire, objective and subjective, descriptive and prescriptive. When these dualisms cease to exist, most of the problems they create also cease to exist. Griffin argues convincingly that practical reason has to mesh with characteristic human motivation, because it grasps certain desirability features linked to human interests.' Times Literary Supplement interesting and suggestive .../ ... a subtle and elegantly written sketch of some promising paths which ethical theorizing might take. / Stephen Darwall, University of Michigan, The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol 49, No. 195, April 1999.