Verification of Arms Reductions

I Role of Verification and Recent Experience.- 1. Transforming the East-West Conflict: The Crucial Role of Verification.- 1.1 Introduction.- 1.2 Arms Control and Verification: Some Conceptual Thoughts.- 1.3 Verification and the Political Debate.- 1.4 Towards Cooperative Security 5.- 1.5 The Role of Verification in the Process of Cooperative Security.- 1.6 Methods of Verification.- 1.7 Technology and Verification.- 1.8 Conclusions.- 1.9 Notes and References.- 2. Experience with INF Treaty Verification and Prospects for Effective Verification of Strategic Arms Reductions.- 2.1 Introduction.- 2.2 The INF Verification Regime.- 2.2.1 The Overall Concept.- 2.2.2 The Details.- 2.2.3 Implementation.- 2.3 Status of Treaty Implementation.- 2.3.1 The On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA).- 2.3.2 The Inspection Process 24.- 2.3.3 The Special Verification Commission (SVC).- 2.4 Verification Problems in Strategic Arms Reductions.- 2.5 Concluding Remarks.- 2.6 Notes.- 3. Experience with INF Treaty Verification and Prospects for the Future.- 3.1 Verification and Arms Control.- 3.2 Verification of the INF Treaty.- 3.3 Future Prospects of Verification.- 4. Mechanisms for Raising and Resolving Compliance Issues.- 4.1 Compliance Problems.- 4.2 Possible New Compliance Mechanisms.- 4.3 A Supranational Arbitration Agency.- 4.4 Notes and References.- II Verification of Mobile Missiles, Nuclear Warheads and Fissile Material.- 5. Verification of Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles.- 5.1 Introduction.- 5.2 SLCMs and Arms Control.- 5.3 SLCM Verification Problems.- 5.4 Verification Approaches.- 5.4.1 Maximal Inspection.- 5.4.2 Minimal Inspection.- 5.4.3 Intermediate Inspection.- 5.5 Conclusion.- 5.6 Notes and References.- 6. Passive Detection of Nuclear Warheads.- 6.1 Introduction.- 6.2 Weapon models.- 6.3 Passive Detection.- 6.3.1 Neutrons.- 6.3.2 Photons.- 6.4 Radiation Detection.- 6.5 Accuracy of Detection Analysis.- 6.6 Evading Passive Detection.- 6.7 Notes and References.- 7. Disposal of Fissile Material from Nuclear Weapons.- 7.1 Introduction.- 7.2 How to Achieve Nuclear Disarmament?.- 7.3 Recycling Plutonium in Nuclear Reactors.- 7.4 Molten Salt Reactors (MSR).- 7.5 How to Burn Nuclear Weapons?.- 7.6 Proliferation Advantages of MSR.- 7.7 Cost of Destroying Nuclear Weapons.- 7.8 Conclusion.- 7.9 Notes and References.- 8. The IAEA's Controls on Fissile Material: Limits and Successes.- 8.1 The Aim of Safeguards: Verification, not Control.- 8.2 Inherent Constraints in a World of Nation States.- 8.3 Incomplete Coverage.- 8.4 Other Limitations.- 8.5 How Safeguards Work.- 8.6 The Size of the Operation.- 8.7 How Effective are IAEA Safeguards?.- 8.8 What Have IAEA Safeguards Achieved?.- 8.9 Risks and Opportunities for IAEA Safeguards.- 8.10 Notes and References.- III Verification of a Nuclear Test Ban.- 9. Can Nuclear Weapons Be Developed Without Full Testing?.- 9.1 Pure Fission Weapons.- 9.2 Boosted Fission Weapons.- 9.3 Thermonuclear Weapons.- 9.4 "Third Generation" Nuclear Weapons.- 9.5 Notes and References.- 10. Recent Developments and Outlook for the Verification of a Nuclear Test Ban.- 10.1 Introduction.- 10.2 Recent Developments.- 10.2.1 The Joint Verification Experiment.- 10.2.2 Controversy over CORRTEX.- 10.2.3 Non-Governmental Verification Developments.- 10.2.4 The Ad-Hoc Group of Seismic Experts at the UN Conference on Disarmament.- 10.2.5 Expenditure on Test-Ban Verification Research.- 10.3 The Office of Technology Assessment Report and its Implications.- 10.4 Prospects for Test Ban Verification.- 10.5 Summary and Conclusions.- 10.6 Notes and References.- 11. UK-USSR and US-USSR Joint Research Programmes in Seismic Verification.- 11.1 Introduction.- 11.2 USA-USSR Programmes.- 11.3 UK-USSR Programmes.- 11.4 Preliminary Analyses of BSVRP Data.- 11.5 Future Developments.- 11.6 Notes and References.- IV Control of Space Weapons.- 12. Recent Developments in Space Weapons.- 12.1 Introduction.- 12.2 Recent Changes in the SDI Program.- 12.3 A New Political Strategy for Star Wars.- 12.4 Star Wars and the ABM Treaty.- 12.5 Anti-Satellite Weapons.- 12.6 Future Prospects.- 13. Verification of a Ban on Space Weapons.- 13.1 Introduction.- 13.2 Components to be Verified.- 13.3 Parameters.- 13.4 Ban on Nuclear Power in Orbits.- 13.5 Notes and References.- V Conventional Stability in Europe.- 14. Concepts of Conventional Stability and Reductions of Arms in Europe.- 14.1 Principles of Conventional Stability.- 14.2 Objects and Difficulties of Negotiations.- 14.3 Stability-Oriented Reductions of Armed Forces in Europe.- 15. Enhancing Conventional Stability in Europe.- 15.1 Introduction.- 15.2 Specific Features of a Conventional Stability Regime.- 15.3 Other Measures.- 15.4 Notes and References.- VI Confidence and Security-Building Measures in Europe.- 16. Verification of Confidence and Security Building Measures: Evolution and Future Prospects.- 16.1 Evolution of CSBMs.- 16.2 The Helsinki Regime.- 16.3 The Stockholm Regime.- 16.4 Future Prospects.- 16.5 Notes and References.- 17. Observations of Military Exercises and On-Site Inspections in Europe.- 17.1 Introduction.- 17.2 The Stockholm Document.- 17.3 NATO Exercises.- 17.4 Need for Extending of CSBMs.- 17.5 Notes and References.- VII Verification of Conventional Force Reductions.- 18. Conventional Arms Reduction in Europe: A Verification Model.- 18.1 Introduction.- 18.2 Verification and the European Scenario.- 18.3 Verification Methods.- 18.3.1 Space-Based Sensors.- 18.3.2 Airborne Sensors.- 18.4 Coverage Problem.- 18.4.1 Types of Areas.- 18.4.2 Complementary Verification Methods.- 18.4.3 Treaty Effectiveness.- 18.5 Conclusions.- 19. Aspects of the Verification of Conventional Arms Control Measures in Europe.- 19.1 Introduction.- 19.2 What is the Real Problem of Verification?.- 19.3 The Envelope Scheme.- 19.4 Tags.- 19.5 Conclusion.- 19.6 Notes and References.- 20. The Verification of Conventional Disarmament Treaties by Remote Sensing.- 20.1 Introduction.- 20.2 Visible light- and near infrared imaging.- 20.2.1 Optics and field of view.- 20.2.2 Sensors.- 20.3 Sensing with Thermal Infrared.- 20.4 Synthetic Aperture Radar.- 20.5 Airborne or Space-Based Remote Sensing?.- 20.6 Possible Verification Tasks.- 20.7 Weather Conditions in Germany.- 20.8 Data Processing and Data Integration.- 20.9 Concluding Remarks.- 20.10 Notes and References.- 21. Verification Techniques for Heavy Land Vehicles Using Short-Range Sensors.- 21.1 Context.- 21.1.1 Geographical and Numerical Limits in Europe.- 21.1.2 Verification Methods.- 21.2 Sensors for Very Short Distances.- 21.3 Sensors for Near Distances.- 21.4 General Problems.- 21.5 Conclusion.- 21.6 Notes and References.- VIII Verification of a Chemical Weapons Ban.- 22. Challenge Inspections in a Chemical Weapons Convention.- 22.1 Introduction.- 22.2 Mandatory Character.- 22.3 Equal Rights, Equal Application.- 22.4 Avoiding the Use for Other Purposes.- 22.5 The Position of the USSR 199.- 22.6 Notes and References.- 23. Verification Procedures for a Chemical Weapons Treaty.- 23.1 Introduction.- 23.2 The Likely Form of the Projected Chemical Weapons Treaty.- 23.3 The Verification System Now Envisaged.- 23.4 Notes and References.- Contributors.- Abbreviations.